


Final Report

Some US Army Recruiting, Retention, Training, and Personnel Implications of the Objective Force: The Army Enlistment Production System

22 April 2002



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Army Vision Goal:

"The most esteemed institution in the nation, the most respected Army in the world, and the most feared ground force to those whose actions would threaten the vital interests of the U.S." (Chief of Staff of the Army, January 2000)

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report was prepared by Gerald A. Klopp, Ph.D. The report was enabled by work performed for the US Navy by Dr. Klopp and Mr. Mark Hemenway (Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the U.S. Navy, 24 September 2001).

Mr. Andrew Cherry (Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center – Fort Lee, VA) provided assistance in materials related to the Army's Objective Force.

This study also benefited from the assistance of Mr. Robert A. Clarke, AEPCO.

Foreword

My review of soldier-related Objective Force Operational and Organizational (O&O) concepts, the past work that I did with the Army Recruiting Command, and the study that I did (as part of a team of senior AEPCO analysts) for the Navy Recruiting Command led me to look at these emerging soldier concepts from a 2010 - 2015 perspective. My initial look gives me strong indications that the Objective Force concepts will most likely exacerbate the recruiting, retention, training, and personnel difficulties unless changes are made to accommodate the Objective Force soldier requirements. As of the time when I was preparing the Combat Service Support (CSS) Objective Force Campaign Analysis Capstone Report – Part II, these areas had little or no work available for inclusion in the Part II report.

In this report, I look at the soldier issue from an Army Enlisted Production System (AEPS) perspective: from recruiting, through training, and career progression (which includes the personnel system and retention). This is an extension of the approach used for the Navy Recruiting study. By looking across the AEPS, I was able to identify areas where the individual concepts may clash, may be incompatible, or may be inconsistent with other parts of the AEPS. I identified issues in this special report when I found these areas of potential discontinuity. Once the AEPS issues are thus identified in this special report, I present several conclusions and recommendations for the Army to consider to address or ameliorate the condition.

I would like to emphasize that this report is not about recruiting. It also is not about training or retention or personnel. Rather, this report is about the system interactions that result from the connections between recruiting, retention, training, and personnel. This systems approach reveals problems and issues that may arise because of discontinuities in the components of the system. Presently, the concentration on the Objective Force concept development is on combat and combat service support issues, with other areas having almost independent (but related) consideration.

Chapter 1 of this report starts with a discussion of the Objective Force soldier capabilities as presented in Chapter 3 of the Objective Force O&O. Because the AEPS community may not have a background in the Objective Force soldier requirements, I extracted a list of soldier concepts from the Objective Force O&O. I also included some of the pertinent soldier-related Analysis Capstone Report – Part II summaries, findings, and conclusions to help the reader understand the Objective Force concepts. The material from the Part II report includes some of the CSS Training concepts and some information on Personnel Service Support (PSS) concepts. Chapter 1 also discusses some of the AEPS implications of the Objective Force soldier capabilities.

Because the Objective Force analysis community may not have a background in the AEPS and the factors that affect the AEPS (e.g., youth demographics, inflation rates, education, training, and the like), Chapter 2 of this report contains a discussion of the present AEPS environment and the changing AEPS environment. This chapter uses a variety of references that are included in the List of References in Appendix A to this

report. In addition to the Army references, I also included several Navy references because they are also applicable to the Army.

Chapter 3 of this report uses additional references to examine the expected future AEPS environment (2010 to 2015 timeframe) when the Objective Force will be fully operational. It is essential that the reader understand that, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this report, the Army has experienced difficulty in the present AEPS. These difficulties include problems in meeting recruit missions, increased resources and incentives to attract the youth market into Army enlistment, and growing losses throughout the entire AEPS. Chapter 3 of this report will show that the youth market will become even more difficult to recruit from and this difficulty will become exacerbated by the Objective Force soldier capabilities.

Chapter 4 of this report consolidates the AEPS issues and discusses some implications of those issues. The analysis presented in Chapter 4 compares the AEPS now and expected future conditions to the Objective Force capabilities discussed in Chapter 1 of this report. From this comparative analysis, issues surface that should be addressed by the AEPS community in concert with the Objective Force design.

Chapter 5 discusses some conclusions and recommendations for future study. This chapter presents several overall conclusions as well as several AEPS process conclusions. It also presents two recommendations. While the literature contains a number of recommendations that may ameliorate the problems facing the AEPS, the studies were not conducted with a view of the Objective Force in mind. Accordingly, my two recommendations concern the need for conducting additional supporting analyses to allow the AEPS community and the Objective Force designers to explore a number of issues. This will enable the AEPS community to begin to identify policies, laws, practices, and other changes that must be made to accommodate the Objective Force design.

Finally, Chapter 5 ends with a discussion on Courses of Action that the Army might take. These Courses of Action include a continuation of the present practices with modifications ("Tweaking") to other Courses of Action that will take time, resources, planning, and significant changes for the Army to accomplish prior to the full implementation of the Objective Force.

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**Some US Army Recruiting, Retention, Training, and Personnel
Implications of the Objective Force:
The Army Enlistment Production System**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

ES 1. Background. The Army employs a process that involves a number of interconnected organizations. The ongoing recruiting, retention, training, and personnel systems are required to maintain the Army's ability to maintain mission effectiveness and readiness of the operating forces. This report looks at the interconnected system consisting of recruiting, retention, training, and personnel systems as the Army Enlistment Production System (AEPS).

The present AEPS has a number of issues that negatively affects its performance. Some of these problems have origins that go back to the days when the present system was developed. These problems are not isolated within a specific part of the process. On the contrary, they go across the entire system so that one problem in one part of the system ripples to other parts of the system. Army policy on retention, for example, affects the number of soldiers that have to be recruited, which affects the training base. There are a number of places where unexpected losses result in over one-third of the recruited soldiers failing to complete contracted years of service. These losses, in turn, affect the recruiting mission. The losses occur in every part of the AEPS:

- Enlistment Processing (prior to contract signing);
- Delayed Entry Program (after contract is signed but prior to basic training);
- Training (usually within the first year of enlistment); and
- Initial assignment.

Losses occur for a variety of reasons. Within the enlistment processing, some candidates are disqualified because of physical, mental, or other reasons. However, a number of candidates simply fail to complete the contracting process. Once a candidate goes through the enlistment processing and a contract is signed, most of the contracted individuals enter the Delayed Entry Program to wait for the training seat that was contracted for to become available. Some of the individuals in the Delayed Entry Program also fail to progress to the training process. Training losses occur for several reasons as well. Some losses are due to injury, failure to meet physical or mental standards, and failure to adjust (for example, the individual "wants out"). Once training is completed, some soldiers drop out at various stages following their initial assignment. Finally, for those soldiers that do complete their initial enlistment, many leave the Army for a variety of reasons. This results in the loss of the technical expertise that has been obtained by the soldiers that have gone through an elaborate process of recruitment, selection and classification, training, and assignment.

In addition to unexpected losses, the environment also affects the AEPS. Youth capabilities, limitations, expectations, experiences, economic conditions, employment possibilities, and many other conditions shape the recruiting market. These conditions

continue to affect the individuals transitioning through recruiting, training, and assignment processes. These conditions are also rapidly changing as new generations of youth gain additional experiences and form new expectations. These changes result in a recruiting environment that is radically different from the original AEPS environment.

While the Army has attempted to adjust the system that was developed for a different set of conditions than what are being experienced by today's youth, the basic philosophy and operating principles remain the same. Increasingly, this is causing difficulty in the AEPS in a number of areas that include unplanned losses, turnover, and turbulence. One of the historical means of dealing with these issues has been the infusion of more resources (human as well as financial). As the problems continue to manifest themselves, the infusion of more resources resulted in a system that has increasingly become inefficient and ineffective.

ES 2. Scope. AEPCO senior analysts have participated in a number of analysis events (e.g., workshops, action officer analysis sessions, and senior-level exercises) associated with the Army Transformation. Some of the work done for these analysis events was done by Combat, Combat Service Support, Training, Personnel Service Support, and other functional experts. However, the AEPCO senior analysts have observed that there has been a lack of coverage in analysis events on recruiting, retention, personnel, and training, their interaction with each other, and the interaction effects with the youth market from which the Objective Force soldiers will be recruited. This report explores some of the contemporary issues associated with the interaction of these functional areas and the likely interaction of these functional areas and the future youth market changes. Additionally, certain policies, practices, and traditions of the Army are evaluated with respect to the interaction of the functional areas and the future youth market. This is only meant to be a preliminary and cursory look at the issues of the AEPS and Objective Force. Additional analyses, involving the functional subject matter experts, will have to be completed to enable the Army to develop a strategy for addressing the Objective Force AEPS issues raised in this report and subsequent AEPS analysis events.

ES 3. The Objective Force Soldier Capabilities. The Operational and Organizational concepts for the Objective Force contains a number of soldier capabilities. The report documents 24 of these capabilities (they are not mutually exclusive, nor are they necessarily all inclusive of the required soldier capabilities). The literature consulted for this report indicates that the top capabilities for the future soldier will consist of:

- Mental agility and the ability to assimilate large volumes of information;
- Able to rapidly form teams;
- Conscientious and integrity;
- High quality and versatile;
- Physical agility and competency;
- Multifunctional; and
- Reduced need for formal training.

Additional Objective Force capabilities not listed above are also contained in the Objective Force Operational and Organizational concepts:

- Able to use high technology;
- Able to work as a distributed system;
- Able to use/exploit improved lethality;
- Able to transition to different missions; and
- Able to be trained for full spectrum operations (greater training requirements than present).

To achieve some of the Objective Force goals, a number of technological enablers have been incorporated into the design. The total list of Objective Force enablers grows with the development of each separate concept. Undoubtedly, the competition for resources for this growing list of enablers is going to have to be met with reduced force structure (e.g., the “bill payer”). Indeed, the O&O requirements call for a reduced footprint. Additionally, the reduction of footprint has been one of the constants across the Army Transformation Wargames. The concern for this reduction in footprint has also been a source of discussion by CSS analysts in many of the exercises.

The implication of footprint, enablers, and cost on the soldier is immense. When coupled with the concept of agility, ability/training in many mission sets, etc., this could mean even more frequent and longer deployments. This will only make the problem of family life for the soldier even more acute.

For example, the Objective Force units are being designed to be able to operate across a wide spectrum of mission sets. While this will give the units more utility, it also means that they will probably be deployed more. The training concept will accommodate this by developing more distance learning and “just in time” training. One should question if the soldiers will have time to do all of this training, get their civilian education (e.g., college credits), and maintain an acceptable family life style. The civilian education is important because it is an important recruiting incentive. The importance of this incentive is already diminished as soldiers find that they have little chance to complete in-service education. To obtain the civilian education that they enlisted for, the soldier now leaves the service. Obviously, this will make it very difficult to retain the quality soldiers that the Objective Force concept requires. One should also question if the personnel system can handle such ad hoc training in lieu of formal classroom training that “punches a ticket” for promotion. It will be very difficult for an individual to plan a career path when there are few or no opportunities for receiving career-building assignments.

ES 4. Objective Force Summary. The Objective Force will result in a much more capable Army with greater lethality, faster deployment capability, and higher technology systems. The transformation includes changes in operational concepts and doctrine, organizational structure changes, and a significant number of technology enablers. However, the thrust of the transformation analysis has not effectively looked at the AEPS and its transformation. As a result, there are a number of issues that are not being evaluated. Indeed, the cursory look in this report at the AEPS from an Objective Force perspective indicates that several of the Objective Force capabilities will exacerbate the already troubled AEPS.

If the Army continues to use historical methods to address the AEPS Objective Force issues, the Army will continue the process of modifications rather than looking at structural changes that should be made. Given the present difficulties with the AEPS, the changing environment, and the characteristics of the Objective Force, a number of issues have been identified in this report. The issues are categorized into several subject areas with considerations affecting the issue.

- The current AEPS is outdated, inefficient, and is not oriented toward a civilian market.
- Unexpected losses, which are being experienced system-wide, result in little or no return on investment and are not getting sufficient management attention.
- The focus of management is short-term; there is little long-term focus on Objective Force effects on the future AEPS.
- Changes occur in the AEPS operational environment faster than the institutional training can accommodate.
- The AEPS lacks sufficient funds and funding authority to carry out needed / essential programs while at the same time achieving the Objective Force capabilities and obtaining technological enablers.
- Policies are ineffective in dealing with the civilian market and some policies (e.g., weight, retention, performance) run counter to retaining technically qualified soldiers.
- The recruiting market is rapidly changing, but there is not an effective program to evaluate how the changing attitudes of the market could affect the Objective Force.
- The personnel system has a number of characteristics that hurts the AEPS now and will cause even more difficulty with achieving the Objective Force desired capabilities (lack of lateral entry, end strength determination, turnover, first-term attrition, DEP losses, up or out policy, zero defects, forced rotations, micromanagement, family life, and treating soldiers as interchangeable parts).
- Increased Objective Force training requirements will put increased pressure on soldiers and their families, on the personnel and recruiting systems, and on turnover.
- A key to success of the Objective Force will be to increase retention of technical skills to reduce funding, personnel, training, and other requirements.
- Army recruiting diverts soldiers from the tasks for which they enlisted and increasingly is bringing in marginal soldiers that do not meet Army needs to fill unexpected vacancies.

Enabling Actions:

- Split-based operations reduces deployment requirements and makes possible the use of non-uniformed individuals to carry out essential Army technical jobs (e.g., contractors or civilian employees).
- Change AEPS processes to facilitate lateral entry of individuals with high technical skills.
- Future training should include ethics training as well as technical training.
- Deliver clear messages about corporate values, up front.

- Do not use phrases like “paying your dues” and “long hours will get you ahead” (or, as frequently is stated in the military, “do more with less”).
- Providing for the quality of life is important.
- Assure that there is a stimulating work environment.
- Provide opportunities for friendship and training opportunities.
- Focus on the task instead of outcomes.
- Provide clear guidance.
- Some individuals will progress faster than others.
- Sell the individuals on the big picture; they like forward thinking.
- Provide examples of success and opportunity to advance.
- Show the individuals that they can succeed. The path to success should not be littered with anachronistic obstacles.

ES 6. AEPS Objective Force Issues. Several Objective Force issues that emerge from this review of literature on the future youth market are listed below.

- Overall Physical fitness requirements of the Objective Force versus decline in youth physical fitness.
- Reduced footprint versus need to accommodate limited capability to perform physical tasks (this is not just a gender issue).
- Declining propensity to serve in the military.
- Inability of the Army to differentiate between incoming individuals with technical skills.
- Lack of lateral entry opportunities for individuals with technical skills.
- Differences in generational perspective on issues and solutions (includes leadership).
- Increased competition for youth:
 - Among uniformed services;
 - With colleges; and
 - With industry.
- Growing perception that military is not “fun” and lacks job security.
- The military may be forced to accept lower quality as “fairness” or to prove diversity.
- Different value systems for generations (“Me” is not consistent with duty, honor, country).
- More Diversity: female roles, minorities, and language/education.

One observation based on the review of literature on the present and future youth market seems to be inescapable: change in the market will continue to negatively impact the Army’s ability to acquire and retain the number of quality soldiers required of the present and Objective Force system. A corollary observation follows, then, that since the present policies are ineffective in dealing with the present conditions, as the environment continues to be less hospitable toward military service, the policies will become even more ineffective in dealing with Objective Force AEPS issues.

ES 7. Conclusions. The primary conclusion is that, based on the literature review and other analyses performed, the AEPS does not appear to be very well coordinated. Indeed,

some of the Objective Force concepts from one AEPS area may cause extreme stress on other parts of the AEPS. Additionally, some of the present recruiting and retention problems in the future will be exacerbated by the Objective Force concepts unless the Army changes some of its practices. Chapter 5 lists several other overall conclusions as well as several AEPS process conclusions.

ES 8. Recommendations. The primary recommendation is that the Army should hold a series of Senior Wargames with participants from the Recruiting, Training, Personnel, and Policy areas to map out a consistent strategy to deal with the Objective Force from a soldier and AEPS perspective. These wargames would provide an opportunity for the Objective Force community and the AEPS community to better understand the implications of each aspect of the Objective Force concept development. Additionally, the Army needs an outsider to look at all of its current processes in view of the Objective Force design concepts and make recommendations to align them with the modern times. This will enable the AEPS community to begin to identify policies, laws, practices, and other changes that must be made to accommodate the Objective Force design.

ES 9. Courses of Action. Possible changes to the AEPS cover a very broad set of circumstances that would involve some significant changes for the Army to implement. Obviously, prior to initiating changes, the Army would have to have a thorough assessment of the changes to determine policies, procedures, and perhaps laws that might have to be changed as well. Some of these changes are within the purview of the AEPS organizations to change and others will take significant effort by the Army to accomplish. Several changes can be grouped into a Course of Action (COA) that will take minimal changes. Other changes will require some organizational changes, while others will require significant organizational changes as well as require moderate resources to implement. Still other recommendations will take a significant change in organizations as well as changes in the fundamental way that the Army accesses manpower.

The APES changes may also require significant resources to implement. However, it is expected that once these changes are made that resources should be reduced when the new AEPS is more efficient and effective. Additionally, given the inertia of change, it is important for the Army to begin to make changes now in anticipation of the Objective Force. Some of the inertia is caused by outdated laws and some is caused by the Army's attempt to adapt a system that was developed for a different time, set of conditions, and generation rather than making genuine changes that address problems that are becoming more acute. The Army could sequence the changes into COAs that start with minor changes ("tweaking" the system) and progress through changes that will take a significant effort to accomplish. Obviously, the decision to implement a specific COA will require further analysis to determine the cost of implementing and the return on investment after implementing. Although the study team has identified some resource implications of the present inefficient system, an evaluation of resource implications of the COAs is outside the scope of this effort.

The Army has many alternative courses of action available to it. Some of the choices of actions that can be taken are listed below.

- **Minor Changes.** Continue to “tweak” the current system without major changes in current processes, policies, and business practices.
- **Increase Competition.** Develop new programs to compete with the other Military Services, educational institutions, and job market.
- **Policy, Practice, and Process Changes.** Make some fundamental changes in policy, business practices, and processes.
- **Organizational Change.** Convert some Military support functions to Civilian support functions.
- **Organizational Change.** The AEPS should be changed to enable the leadership and management to better focus on long-term issues.
- **Resource Change.** The Army should evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of existing and proposed future programs and eliminate those that do not have a good return on investment.
- **Experiment.** The Army should experiment with new programs, expanding programs that work and terminating ones that fail to deliver expected results.

The courses of action should not be viewed as alternatives in the sense that selecting one will preclude the selection of another. Rather, some of the courses of action could be done sequentially. For the short-term, the course of action might be to start out with minimal changes and develop a long-term approach that will phase the changes in policy, business practices, processes, and resources over time. Given the concentration on developing the Objective Force, it is very unlikely that the Army will be able to or desire to initiate broad sweeping changes rapidly.

To enable the long-term courses of action will require an investment strategy to be developed to move from the “tweaking” course of action (e.g., do what can most reasonably be done in the short-term) to the course of action that requires more extensive changes in business practices, policies, processes and resources. In all likelihood, such changes will take place as the Objective Force comes to fruition. The issue is whether the changes will be adaptations to the present inefficient and ineffective processes or planned changes. Thus, the two recommendations (Conduct Wargames and Outside Evaluation) are part of the long-term planning process.

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Some US Army Recruiting, Retention, Training, and Personnel Implications of the Objective Force: The Army Enlistment Production System

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Chapter 1 – Objective Force Soldier Concepts

1.1 Purpose of Report. While conducting Objective Force capstone analysis, AEPCO senior analysts have observed that Objective Force recruiting, retention, training, and personnel issues have been insufficiently addressed in the O&O and the analysis events that have helped to develop the Objective Force, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support concepts. While the focus of the analysis to date has been on the Objective Force combat and combat service support concepts, some analysis of training and personnel service support has been completed. It is expected that ongoing work will address training issues. For example, at the request of the Commander of the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), a training task force was established with specific tasks to perform. Although there have been some training considerations for the Objective Force, the linkage of the recruiting, retention, training, and personnel aspects of the Objective Force have not been as thorough as the combat and combat service support analyses. Additionally, the AEPCO senior analysts have observed that some aspects of the Objective Force concept could exacerbate the already difficult recruiting and retention problem faced by the Army.

AEPCO senior analysts completed the Part I and Part II Analysis Capstone Report of the Objective Force concept, which includes the CSS Training Concept, Personnel, and other functional areas. Because of the lack of coverage of the Recruiting & Retention, Training, and other aspects that will affect the Objective Force when it is fielded, this report was prepared to raise new issues and to consolidate some of the material and issues that have arisen in the literature reviewed and discussions with other analysts. Additionally, this report will provide some conclusions regarding the Army Enlisted Production System (AEPS).

1.2 Introduction to the Objective Force Concepts. The Army Transformation process consists of a set of activities by which the Department of Defense (DoD) will fundamentally change its operational concepts and doctrine, organizational structure, and technology. Transformation involves acquisition of new military systems, as well as modifying doctrine, organizations, training and education, materiel, leadership, and personnel (DOTMLP) policies to maximize the battle space capabilities of planned military forces.

At a January 2000 Transformation Conference held at Fort Monroe, Virginia, the Chief of Staff of the Army (CSA) stated an overall vision for the Army of the future: ***“Getting there with a credible force fast enough.”*** The CSA stated the desired goal for achieving the Army vision: ***“The most esteemed institution in the nation, the most respected Army in the world, and the most feared ground force to those whose actions would threaten the vital interests of the U.S.”*** The Army’s Vision set forth a list of capabilities that would transform the Army of the future. These Army Vision concepts (see [79]*) included:

* Numbers in brackets refer to the Reference number in Appendix A.

- Deploy a combat brigade anywhere in the world in 96 hours, a combat Division in 120 hours, and five Divisions in 30 days.
- All divisions with a common design; internettted Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability.
- Reduced logistics footprint; system of systems approach, and use of a common chassis.
- Army Service Component Commander (ASCC), Joint Forces Land Component Commander (JFLCC), and Army Forces (ARFOR) capable; Corps Headquarters (HQ) and Joint Task Force (JTF) capable.
- Common vehicle platforms; 50-70 percent weight reduction.
- Rapidly transition through full spectrum mission requirements without the loss of momentum.
- Possess reach (forward, back, around) capabilities.

The foundation for the Army Vision was laid years earlier. As reported in Army LINK News [37], the Army will use advanced technology to implement the concept that will make the Army more efficient and lethal to fight and win 21st-century conflicts. However, soldiers with “boots on the ground” will remain an integral part of tomorrow’s force. Thus, it is important to look at the soldier from a broad perspective: recruiting, retention, promotion, family, and other aspects that affect the well being of the soldier.

It is significant to understand that the designers of the Objective Force have built the concept around an extensive number of advanced technological enablers. Many of these enablers have been documented in the AEPCO report titled, CSS Objective Force Campaign Analysis Capstone Report – Part II [50]. This report lists over 70 enablers that the Objective Force will require to meet its design and other objectives. Based on the evaluations performed by AEPCO analysts, the number of enablers was the first of seven Critical Areas of Analysis that lacked adequate analysis coverage. Additionally, given the magnitude of the number of enablers, repeated statements of concern regarding the fierce competition for resources for the enablers were frequently expressed.

These Objective Force concepts have guided the Army’s combat developers in designing the Army of the future. As the concepts have been developed and documented in the appropriate Operational and Organizational concept and other documents, a series of analysis events have also been used to enable the Army to test those designs and concepts in a simulated combat environment. A series of workshops, staff exercises, and other meetings were held for the community to come together to discuss supporting work that would be used in the capstone analysis event referred to as the Army Transformation Wargame (ATWG).

The existing Army of Excellence (AOE) legacy forces will be transformed into the Objective Force of the future (the 2010 - 2015 timeframe) with the capabilities set forth in the CSA’s vision. However, the transformation process will be an ongoing effort requiring a substantial investment in human and monetary resources. Accordingly, there will be Interim Forces that will be designed and fielded as the Army moves toward the

Objective Forces. Thus, the Transformation process has to be concerned with the transitioning from the Legacy Forces to the Interim Forces leading to the Objective Forces. This means that the Objective Force analysis should consider the present as well as expected future environment that will shape or affect soldier-related issues. Accordingly, this report will look at several past, present, and expected future environmental variables to gain insights into possible Objective Force AEPS issues and considerations.

The Objective Force consists of the Army units that will be necessary to achieve the Army's transformation objective. It is a future force – a common design applied to the entire Army that achieves the force characteristics described in the Army Vision. The Objective Force will be capable of dominating at any point on the spectrum of operations and rapid transition across mission requirements without loss of momentum. Such a force provides the National Command Authority (NCA) an increased range of options for regional engagement, crisis response, and sustained land force operations.

The Objective Force is being designed to have the following capabilities [77]:

- Attack against prepared infantry defenses;
- Counterattack against advancing mechanized force;
- Hasty defense against dismounted attack;
- Defend against mounted / dismounted attack;
- Secure a zone to isolate warring factions;
- Rapid reposition by air to conduct hasty attack;
- Defend strongpoint against superior dismounted infantry;
- Rear area security operations for division / corps;
- Combat recon for division offensive operations; and
- Overland forced entry to secure site 50 km from landing site.

The Objective Force O&O does not describe how to fight the transitioning Army that has Legacy, Interim, and Objective Forces. Other documents support and supplement the O&O with information such as how to fight the unit. Because the O&O was being developed for a force that was simultaneously being designed, a series of analysis events had to be conducted to facilitate the development of an appropriate scenario (including opposing forces, deployment schedules, combat and support forces, etc.) as well as the development of concepts of support and other information.

1.3 Operational and Organizational Objective Force Capabilities. The required Objective Force capabilities are extensively discussed in Chapter 3 of the O&O [77]. Additionally, Chapter 5 of the Objective Force O&O [78] discusses the required capability of the Objective Force combat service support functions. From these two chapters of the Objective Force, Table 1 was constructed to summarize several of the pertinent overall capabilities.

Table 1. Objective Force Operational and Organizational Capabilities

| Capability | O&O Page | Discussion |
|--|---------------------|--|
| Strategically responsive forces capable of immediate and decisive action upon arrival. | 3-4 | Future opponent capabilities will reduce indication and warning time. The threat will be less well defined and capable of many strategies. |
| Full spectrum operations | 3-6 | Designed with a core capability to fight and win in Major Theater War (MTW), but flexible and responsive for crisis response, Stability and Support Operations, and extended regional engagements. |
| Accumulator of rapid success | 3-7 | Rapid success will generate and sustain the momentum to win rapidly and decisively. |
| Deploy from garrisons often directly to the combat with operationally significant combat capable organizations | 3-10 | Requires significant change to speed closure and decision. Present capability includes sequenced operations, linear movements, extended timeframes, and prolonged force build-ups. |
| Future Army will offer a decisive menu of essential, complementary, and interchangeable capabilities, skills, and mission focuses. | 3-11 | To realize the Objective Force capabilities, will require the design of modular and agile Army force capabilities that can strike an enemy early or deny the enemy options and the ability to engage the enemy in depth or pressure the enemy from multiple directions simultaneously. |
| To exploit the power of information, the Army will operate under a different philosophy. | 3-20 | Operations conducted by the Objective force can be characterized as listed below. - Dispersed where units use the most effective means to accomplish the mission. - Decentralized where higher echelons monitor unit actions. - Distributed without geographic constraints |
| Majority of Army's combat forces will exist as general-purpose dominant maneuver forces | 3-27 | The multidimensional nature of Army capabilities denies any opponent the ability to focus on countering a specific capability. Additional capability will be added when needed. Active Component (AC) / Reserve Component (RC) integration at brigade and below is required to maintain mission capability and readiness. |
| AC/RC structure and Integration | 3-30 | The Army will be made of totally integrated complementary components that ensure dominant, agile, and versatile capabilities. |
| Possess nine key operational capabilities: - Fight and win; - Responsiveness; - Deployable; - Agility; - Versatility; - Lethal; - Survivable; - Sustainable; and - The soldier. | 3-33 | The key operational capabilities operationalize the Objective Force characteristics: - Nonnegotiable contract with the American people; - Quality of time, distance, and sustained momentum; - Capability to put combat forces anywhere in the world; - Mental and physical ability across mission sets; - With minimal adjustment and time, generate formations; - Every element capable of combat power; - Provide maximum protection to soldier; - Reduce footprint and replenishment demand; and - Able to fight and win anywhere, anytime. |
| Training, Leader Development, and Soldiers | 3-45 | Demands of future distributed and non-linear battlefield will place greater responsibilities on leaders. Requirements for soldier proficiency will increase in many areas. Training requirements for a full spectrum Objective Force will be greater than today's already heavy burden. |

The capabilities listed in Table 1 are not mutually exclusive, nor are they inclusive of all of the capabilities listed in the O&O. However, they do illustrate the significant change in the Objective Force concepts. As explicitly recognized in the O&O, the Objective Force will place greater demands on training, leader development, and soldiers. These changes will not only place added burden on the soldier, they will place added burden on the personnel system, the training system, the personnel acquisition system, and soldier retention. Thus, it is insightful to look at these changes to obtain a perspective on the changes and demands that they will cause.

As opposed to the Objective Forces, the present forces were built upon some fundamentally different concepts. Today's units were built to operate as a unit. When the unit structure is broken, the unit itself has difficulty conducting operations since it was not designed, equipped, or trained to operate in a split mode. Units also generally had to be built near a combat location before they could be effective in combat. In Operation Desert Storm, for example, the building of the combat force took months of concerted effort and a huge amount of support capability. Soldiers typically train for limited mission sets and receive formal scheduled training at various career points. However, as shown in Table 1, these, and many more capabilities will be changed under the Objective Force concepts.

Note that Table 1 does indicate changes in soldier capabilities and training requirements. Again, it is important to note that the O&O addresses the operational changes in the Objective Force. It is not intended to and does not address the impact of the changes on personnel acquisition, retention, or other aspects that affect the soldier. However, the impact on these soldier-related impacts could be significant in the future.

The Objective Force will possess nine key operational capabilities as shown in Table 1. One of those key operational capabilities, "The Soldier" is discussed throughout the O&O. However, by doing so, the O&O does not adequately convey the degree to which the soldier will be affected in the future. For this reason, the next section of this report presents a discussion of the O&O Objective Force soldier capabilities.

1.4 Operational and Organizational Objective Force Soldier Capabilities. The Objective Force (Chapter 3) discusses a number of soldier capabilities. However, the O&O more thoroughly discusses the capabilities of the Objective Force. The majority of the discussion of the soldier generally follows the overall Objective Force capabilities. These soldier capabilities are summarized in Table 2. As with the Objective Force capabilities, the Objective Force soldier capabilities are not mutually exclusive (e.g., physical agility and high physical competency).

To put the soldier concepts into perspective, additional references were consulted. Given the time available to prepare this initial look at these issues, it was not possible to obtain additional references that address each of the soldier capabilities. However, references were located that address some of the more significant issues that already confronts the Army. By doing so, this report suggests that the problems that the Objective Force will

face are already present. Without attention, the issues will be even more profound as the Objective Force comes to fruition.

Table 2. O&O Objective Force Soldier Capabilities

| O&O Soldier Concept | O&O Page | Discussion |
|---|---------------------|--|
| Defining Army capability | 3-4 | For the foreseeable future, the soldier on the ground engaging in close combat will remain the Army's defining capability. |
| Indispensable resource | 3-4 | The soldier will remain an indispensable resource for the Nation. |
| Able to rapidly form teams | 3-26 | Versatile organizations and equipment and agile doctrine, leaders and soldiers and self-synchronization will reduce the requirement for formal rapid teaming. |
| Mental Agility: Decide faster than enemy | 3-34 | Presented with the same information as an opponent, they will "be quicker on the draw." |
| Adaptive thinker | 3-34 | Mental agility will derive from Leaders and soldiers trained to be adaptive thinkers. |
| Physical Agility: Able to move rapidly | 3-35 | A force that is capable of maneuver operations on 95% of the earth's inhabited terrain as a member of a joint force that is capable of exerting control over 90% of the earth's surface. |
| Able to transition to different missions | 3-34 | Individuals and units will be capable of near simultaneous execution of offensive and defensive operations and able to transition seamlessly to stability and support operations. |
| Assimilate large volumes of information; translate sensor-provided information. | 3-34 | Through Doctrine, Training, Leader Development and Soldiers individuals will be able to assimilate large volumes of information and translate sensor-provided situational awareness into situational understanding. |
| Able to use high technology | 3-36 | Some of the multiple examples: information systems, direct & indirect fires, long-range acquisition and targeting systems, and advanced ballistic personal protection. |
| Able to work as distributed system | 3-37 | Objective Force units will seamlessly sustain multiple, distributed, high tempo operations with one half of current in-theater footprint. |
| Use/exploit improved lethality | 3-37 | Soldiers will exploit improved lethality to reduce reliance on marksmanship/gunnery training for close combat. |
| High physical competency | 3-37 | Physical, moral, and mental competence will give the strength, the confidence, and the will to fight and win anywhere, any time. |
| Link C4I capabilities when dismounted | 3-37 | Soldiers will have enhanced capabilities to link systems C4I capabilities when dismounted. |
| Use embedded planning and rehearsal tools | 3-37 | Embedded planning and rehearsal tools will enable training and distance learning and support capabilities. |
| Improved strategic responsiveness and core warfighting capabilities | 3-41 | Improved strategic responsiveness and core warfighting abilities will enable the forces to effectively fight as an integral component of a joint, interdependent, full spectrum, mission tailored force. |
| Provide combat and non-combat support | 3-41 | The Objective Force will provide responsive, quality support in both the combat and non-combat areas of general administration and services, individual protection and survivability, soldier sustainment, equipment endurance and functionality, and morale and welfare operations. |

Continued on the next page.

Table 2. O&O Objective Force Soldier Capabilities (Continued)

| O&O Soldier Concept | O&O Page | Discussion |
|--|---------------------|--|
| Use technology for personal protection | 3-43 | The Objective Force will use technology that provides maximum protection to the forces at the soldier level whether that soldier is dismounted or mounted. |
| High quality and versatile soldiers; possess advanced capabilities | 3-44 | In order to be effective across the full spectrum of conflict and geography, the Objective Force must have quality and versatile soldiers with advanced capabilities to dominate close combat, from beyond line of sight to the ultimate seizure and control of an objective. |
| Greater training requirements than present | 3-45 | Training requirements for a full spectrum Objective Force will be greater than the already heavy burden that exists today. |
| Appropriate resources | 3-45 | The Objective Force requires capabilities, resources, and training management that will ensure that its forces are dominant across the full spectrum of conflict. |
| Perform functions of supporting soldiers | 5-6 | The combat soldiers of tomorrow will be required to perform many of the more traditional sustainment functions, such as modular component replacement. |
| Use technology to lessen physical functions | 5-6 | Artificial intelligence and robotics, e.g., for Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), materials handling and supply convoy operations, will augment soldiers and be available to operators and sustainers to lessen physical requirements, reduce Maneuver Support (MS) force vulnerabilities, and simplify procedures. |
| Multifunctional CSS units and soldiers | 5-10 | The sustainers in 2010 will have to be multi-functional, across several sustainment functions. Sustainment organizations will principally be comprised of multi-functional, modular, and easily tailored units that meet the force requirements across the full spectrum of conflict. |
| Leverage C4ISR assets | 5-12 | The Objective Force will face extended deployment ranges and will depend heavily on fixed infrastructures. Because of this, the ability and capability to leverage all available C4ISR assets to maintain situational awareness and provide a common understanding is critical down to the soldier level. |

The soldier capabilities in Table 2 are presented in the order that they are discussed in the Objective Force O&O. They have not been ordered or prioritized by importance or impact. However, the literature that will be discussed below indicates that some of the capabilities listed in Table 2 will be more important than others. The "Recruits of 2010" [55] literature suggests that these capabilities can be ordered as follows:

- Mental agility and the ability assimilate large volumes of information;
- Able to rapidly form teams;
- Conscientiousness and integrity;
- High quality and versatile;
- Physical agility and competency;
- Multifunctional; and
- Reduced need for formal training.

With the exception of conscientiousness and integrity, the O&O discusses these Objective Force soldier capabilities. The findings of several pertinent references are discussed below.

The topic of "Recruits of 2010" was the subject of a meeting of senior military, civilian, and academic leaders [55] who met in Chicago, Illinois in September, 1995 to answer three questions.

- What skills, knowledge, and abilities are needed by the soldiers of the Force XXI Army?
- Will the nation's education system provide those capabilities?
- If there is a gap, what must the Army do to bridge it?

In answering these questions, the panel also determined that intelligence is the most important asset for the future soldier. As stated by Dr. Michael Rumsey (US Army Research Institute), **"There will be more information to be processed. Quick judgments about this information will be needed."** After intelligence, the panel determined that the abilities of future soldiers to cooperate and work as a team are the next most important assets. Conscientiousness and integrity (core Army values) tied for third as the next most important quality of the future Objective Force soldiers.

Those attending the conference also agreed that quality people would be a requirement for the Army of the future. The competition for the quality soldier will be acute. According to the group, **"One of the most important factors in recruiting those quality people will be a favorable public image of the Army. Also, the Army must be able to compete with the civilian world in areas such as pay, education benefits, and tuition assistance."** The competitive forces have already exerted pressure on the Army's ability to attract and retain high quality soldiers. Subsequent chapters in this report will address this issue in greater detail.

Higher physical competency is a contemporary topic of great discussion. High physical standards have been shown to negatively affect recruiting and retention. For example, the Army Research Institute published a September 1999 report [70] that states, **"The physical rigors of basic training are well known to youth and may deter enlistment for those who are uncertain of their abilities to stand up to them."** On the other hand, lower standards affects mission capability for combat troops. Several other implications of physical fitness will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this report. However, it is important to understand that the concept of physical fitness for the Army of the future is being reexamined.

Soldiers Online presents an article by Dr. Ed Thomas on Warrior-based Physical Training [71]. The article discusses the origin of current physical readiness training (PRT) that was created in the early 1980-s at the Soldier Support Center, Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana. According to the article, **"Current PRT doctrine is 20 years old and obsolete."** Whereas the present emphasis on PRT is health promotion, the growing expectation is a warrior orientation. The present PRT establishes standards for push-ups, sit-ups, and a two-mile run. However, functional fitness, according to the article,

includes agility, balance, coordination, and numerous other physical parameters that translate into mission-essential task-list capabilities.

The present Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) does not measure the soldier's ability to move well on the battlefield. Additionally, the article points out that Army recruits generally have poor posture and motor patterns that impede training and lead to injuries. Future training will include rational motor-skills training that includes ropes, ladders, climbing grids, vaulting platforms, and other devices designed to teach complex motor skills. Clearly, such a radical change in PRT will have implications for the training base, recruiting, retention, and other Army processes. What must be evaluated is how such training can be progressively applied to accommodate the growing lack of physical fitness in the youth population.

An Army LINK news bulletin titled "Task force recommends soldiers be multi-skilled" [8] reports that a recently-established Army Development Systems XXI task force recommended to the Army Chief of Staff General Eric K. Shinseki the concept of a "multi-skilled soldier" as the underpinning future Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) and force structure considerations. The news bulletin goes on to explain that **"Changes in the operational environment occurs faster than we can react with institutional training programs and we may not be able to accurately quantify with an MOS all things soldiers may be required to do."**

As a result of the changes, the task force recommends that institutional training be more focused on the core job competencies that comprise a soldier's MOS duties as opposed to all of the separate tasks. This may result in the reduction of the number of MOS used by the Army. Presently, the Army has 241 MOS in its inventory. Initial estimates indicate that the number could be cut to about 200. The reduction of the number of MOS as well as the concentration on core job competencies will be accompanied by greater emphasis on directed, self-development beyond the required institutional Army schools and providing the proper resources for that development. A rewritten Army Pamphlet 600-25 will lay out the training and operational assignments required for development along specific career paths.

The Objective Force soldier requirements will undoubtedly result in a formidable, flexible, force. However, it will also place immense pressure on the recruiting, retention, personnel, and training systems and will exacerbate an already difficult recruiting and retention problem. The following sections explore the Objective Force concepts and implications from a training, personnel, recruiting, and retention perspective.

1.5 Some Implications of the Objective Force Concepts. Of the literature reviewed by the AEPCO analysts, a limited amount of training and Personnel Service Support strategy was available for review. As will be summarized below, the training strategy parallels the concepts in the Objective Force O&O and requires enabling technology. The personnel concept deals almost exclusively with soldier support, but ignores the problems of career progression, promotions, etc. that will result when the Objective Force concepts are implemented.

The Objective Force training concept has only recently been developed, so there is little specific information on how the concepts will be accomplished. The CSS training strategy has been designed with an awareness of the need to provide leader training that covers the spectrum of experience, from home stations and combat training centers to institutions, as well as en route to and into the deployed theaters. The strategy emphasizes the importance of providing the right training, at the right time, in the right mode, to the right people, for the right cost. The training concept requires a blending of institutional, self-development, and unit training with new and updated doctrine that is influenced by technology. The CSS training strategy is designed to develop proactive CSS leaders and soldiers with multifunctional capabilities who are “aggressive, adaptive, situationally aware, and highly trained.”

According to an article in Soldiers Magazine, Major General Dennis D. Cavin, training requirements will be essential for the Objective Force to succeed (“Soldiers: The Future of ADA) [11].

- We must train confident, competent soldiers and leaders who are mentally and physically prepared for the rigors of war by developing a “We Fight Tonight” ethic.
- We must revitalize the role of the noncommissioned officer (NCO) as the foundation of, and a key member of, all leadership teams.
- We must enforce training management programs to ensure that predictability becomes part of everyday life for soldiers, civilians and family members.
- We must produce leaders who recognize that chevrons and rank insignia are not symbols of privilege but badges of servitude to the soldiers they lead.

Several training and leadership issues have already been identified (Draft white paper titled, Combat Service Support Transformation Training Strategy for Objective Force 2010) [74]. These issues generally relate to how the O&O soldier capabilities will be accomplished in the future. To address these issues, a number of training strategies will be used in the future.

- Technology will be used to acquire information, knowledge, and wisdom to help clarify the chaos and complexity of the battlespace.
- Embedded intelligent tutoring will allow training tools and equipment to analyze the different ways in which individuals approach training.
- Provide leaders development experiences that allow them the chance to learn from their decisions and actions.
- Displace some degree of live training environments and resident training with virtual reality suites.
- Leaders will be placed in the midst of a simulated conflict, fully engaged in making strategic decisions based on real time data.
- Performance for leaders and soldiers can be enhanced in areas of memory, cognition, and general health through technology, biology, and psychology.
- Advanced technologies to promote advanced learning and training for the Objective Force include: knowledge management; motor skill development; and animated human technology.

- The dynamics and dimensions of future technology will shape the direction of leader training. The training community will have to maintain a constant commitment toward staying abreast of changing technologies and finding ways to incorporate appropriate technologies into its overall training strategy and programs.

Several observations regarding the training strategy should be noted.

- The primary focus is on training and Leader development.
- The training strategy incorporates the use of an extensive amount of training enablers. These enablers will have to compete for funding for the already large and growing list of enablers associated with the Objective Force.
- The extensive use of enablers will, in and of itself, create the need for more advanced training to keep the soldiers and leaders current in the latest technology. This will, in turn, put even more pressure on the community for more advanced training.
- The training strategy does not address the implications of future policies on career progression, assignment rotation, personnel acquisition, and other personnel policies that already are causing difficulty for the Army.
- The training strategy does not appear to be focused on the “Soldier” as much as it focuses on leadership training. While Leadership training and development will be crucial for the success of the Objective Force, soldier training will be equally crucial. The issue of personnel policy will also be an important consideration for soldier training and development.

1.6 Summary and Introduction to Chapter 2. The total list of Objective Force enablers grows with the development of each separate concept. Undoubtedly, the competition for resources for this growing list of enablers is going to have to be met with reduced force structure (e.g., the “bill payer”). Indeed, the O&O requirements call for a reduced footprint. However, the reduction of footprint has been one of the constants across the ATWGs. The concern for this reduction in footprint has also been a source of discussion by analysts in many of the exercises.

The implication of footprint, enablers, and cost on the soldier is immense. When coupled with the concept of agility, ability/training in many mission sets, etc., this could mean even more frequent and longer deployments. This will only make the problem of family life for the soldier even more acute.

For example, the Objective Force units are being designed to be able to operate across a wide spectrum of mission sets. While this will give the units more utility, it also means that they will probably be deployed more. The training concept will accommodate this by developing more distance learning and “just in time” training. One should question if the soldiers will have time to do all of this training, get their civilian education (e.g., college credits), and maintain an acceptable family life style. The civilian education is important because it is an important recruiting incentive. The importance of this incentive is already diminished as soldiers find that they have little chance to complete in-service education. To obtain the civilian education that they enlisted for, the soldier now leaves the service. Obviously, this will make it very difficult to retain the quality

soldiers that the Objective Force concept requires. One should also question if the personnel system can handle such ad hoc training in lieu of formal classroom training that “punches a ticket” for promotion. It will be very difficult for an individual to plan a career path when there are few or no opportunities for receiving career-building assignments.

Whereas this chapter has explored some of the Objective Force O&O concepts, the next chapter of this report will discuss the Army Enlistment Production System. Chapter 2 will then explore the present and past and the conditions that have led to the present system. As was discussed above, the Objective Force soldier-related concepts will demand even more than what is presently being demanded of the soldier. It is important to understand these conditions because, unless they are significantly addressed in the Objective Force concepts, the AEPS environment for the Objective Force may not be adequate to cope with the soldier concepts laid out in the Objective Force O&O.

Chapter 3 explores some expected changes in the youth market from which the Objective Force AEPS will be recruited. Unfortunately, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, changes in the youth market are also expected to negatively affect the future AEPS environment for the Objective Force.

Chapter 4 will “put it all together” to analyze the Objective Force AEPS issues with respect to the expected youth market that will be in place for the Objective Force. Using the issues thus identified, Chapter 5 will present some conclusions and recommendations.

Chapter 2. The Army Enlistment Production System

2.1 Introduction to the Army Enlistment Production System. The Army's ability to maintain mission effectiveness and unit readiness depends on a series of interrelated processes and is affected by many national, Department of Defense, Department of the Army, and other policies. The interconnectivity of these processes results in changes being felt throughout the entire system as a result of changes in a part of the system.

The ongoing recruitment, training, and retention efforts to attract, train, and retain high quality youth are critical to the success of the Army and requires the commitment of the Army Enlistment Production System community. While the US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) is responsible for ensuring that sufficient numbers of high quality youth join the Army, other organizations have an influential role in recruiting. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASA/M&RA), and HQ Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) are responsible for developing guidance and policy in support of the Army recruiting mission. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) also provides overall policy guidance to the individual military services in accordance with public laws and other policies established at the national level.

The Operational Forces establish the requirements for the number of soldiers needed, the skills and ranks, and schedule for the requirements. Soldiers are introduced into the Army through the recruiting action of USAREC. Embedded within this recruiting process is a process that deals with selection, classification, and contracting. This embedded process is conducted by the US Military Entrance Processing Command (USMEPCOM).

The Army Enlistment Production System is a very complex system. Although the processes have been modified over years, the AEPS processes already cause difficulties across the AEPS. According to the May 2000 USAREC Recruiting Campaign Plan [76], current processes are producing marginal soldiers that will not be able to sustain the Army in the Objective Force. As further stated in the Recruiting Campaign Plan, **"Now more than ever, the Army cannot effectively use many marginal recruits because the number and complexity of military systems planned to be introduced between 2000 and 2025 are creating a growing requirement for skilled operators (Binkin, 1994). A majority of current high school seniors plan to attend college, which is growing since the 1970's. This means that high school graduates who choose to continue their education tend to have greater skills and higher aptitudes than those who do not. This also means that the recruit pool has grown smaller and the skills and aptitudes of individuals currently in this pool have decreased."**

It is important to view the process of soldier acquisition, training, assignment, and discharge as an interconnected Army Enlistment Production System process. Policies of one organization have effects throughout the interconnected AEPS. For example, physical standards required for Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support positions affect the physical quality requirements of recruits, the training requirements of

the training base, the retention policies of the Army, and the promotion capabilities of individuals. Likewise, the soldier mental capability requirements affect the entire AEPS. Premature losses (attrition) that occur at any place in the AEPS not only results in a loss of soldier capability in the Operating Force, it results in an increased recruiting mission to replace the premature loss and undoubtedly adds to the overall AEPS resource requirements.

The AEPS was essentially designed during the draft era when the military services had to take in a large number of individuals and make effective soldiers out of them in a relatively short period of time. Changes to the system up to now have mostly been adaptations to the processes established during the Second World War. This means that some of the traditions that were formed during the draft era have persisted to the present with little or no change. Perhaps the most significant change, however, resulted when the services went to the all-volunteer concept. With this change, the services increasingly turned to a growing list of monetary and other incentives to induce a growingly reluctant youth population to enlist, increased human resources to recruit and process the enlistees, and developed advertising campaigns to inform the youth and other influencers of the options available. However, the basic AEPS remains essentially the same.

During the draft era, the military not only had an assured source for the number of soldiers required, it also developed the ability to select and classify soldiers to satisfy its growing needs for technical skills. Obviously, with a national policy on conscription, propensity to serve or the desire of an individual was not necessarily a consideration when the AEPS policies and practices were designed.

Since the inception of the all-voluntary Army, the military is increasingly finding that individuals in the changing recruiting environment, however, are not as positively propensed to enlist as previous generations. Additionally, the military itself is undergoing significant changes in how it uses manpower (quality and quantity of soldiers and the increasing technical requirements for the high quality soldiers). A 1997 RAND report (Re-engineering DoD Recruiting [72]) states, **"The changing military environment along with new trends in youth behavior makes it imperative that the recruiting system becomes a learning organization that evaluates new parameters quickly and adjusts resources to efficiently meet the recruiting mission."**

It is also noted that the Navy shares many of the Army's practices, has a very similar EPS, and has been subjected to high-level scrutiny. Indeed, an observation that is as true for the Army as it is the Navy was made in the October 2000 Navy Anniversary Issue of SEA*POWER by then Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig [21]: **"I believe that we are still infected by the 'psychology of conscription' more than a generation after our conversion to an all-voluntary force. We consider Sailors and Marines to be free labor, available for all manner of work that outside the military would be eliminated, simplified, automated, or performed by less expensive personnel."**

Mr. Danzig also identified other difficulties that the Department of the Navy (DON) is facing. Specifically, he felt that the Navy EPS has some serious flaws that inhibit

completion of military service. Mr. Danzig further stated in SEA*POWER, **“Our Sailors and Marines are wooed by civilian employers and influenced by their non-Navy spouses’ careers. We need to let people do the jobs they are trained for and cut down on waiting time, unnecessary administrative burdens, and demoralizing career paths.”** Mr. Danzig gave several examples of current Navy practices that adversely affect the Sailor and some contemporary solutions to the problems. Many of these problems and practices are common to the Army Enlistment Production System as well.

This chapter of the report will deal with situations leading to the present recruiting, training, personnel, and retention processes and associated issues. The following sections of this chapter discuss the present AEPS environment. It is important to have an understanding of the present AEPS and the conditions that affect it before turning to the future. Following a discussion of the conditions leading to the present AEPS environment, this chapter discusses several implications of the AEPS. This chapter concludes with a summary and introduction to the next chapter, which discusses the future recruiting environment.

2.2 Situations Leading to the Present Army Enlistment Production System. The military is operating under a draft-era (“conscription”) mentality with an environment that has undergone significant change over the years. This surely will create even more difficulty within the AEPS as the environment changes even more as the Army approaches the Objective Force years. Under the draft system, the military was faced with taking in a large number of under educated individuals that did not necessarily want to be a part of the military establishment. Because of its growing needs for technically minded individuals, the military had to develop a system that would rapidly select and classify individuals that could be given technical training in a very short period of time. One of the key tools in that selection and classification process was the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The system in use presents a large, complex number of career choices to prospective enlistees in terms that are not familiar to them. This could help to explain why recruits have dissatisfaction with their choices once they become more familiar with what these positions really consist of.

In addition to selection and classification, the military services had to develop a very efficient way of processing large number of conscripted individuals through the entry system. However, this was a system that was not particularly interested in the individual’s desires. The needs of the military became the driving force in the selection and classification process. Many of the procedures established in those days of conscription are still in use today despite the tremendous changes, educational achievements of enlistees, and increased technical skills in the population being recruited.

The present situation is a direct result of changes in the market while the military was preoccupied with a significant downsizing effort following the end of the cold war. Despite the downsizing effort, the military services faced an increasing operating tempo (OPTEMPO) with reduced budgets and reduced manpower. As competition for the now decreasing number of positions increased, the atmosphere within the military services

became more competitive for retention. “Up or out” became more severe as the military needed to cull its upper ranks. “Zero defects” became the operational norm in evaluating individual performance. Obviously, in an organization that has to downsize, some method is needed to force turnover if sufficient numbers are not departing of their own initiative. These conditions did not go unnoticed by the market that was more and more viewing the forced attrition of the military as less security for employment prospects, less rewarding from a monetary prospective, and more demanding of time and energy at the expense of family and personal time.

AEPCO senior analysts interviewed several Army and Navy officers to gain insights into the enlistment production process. The results of the interviews (and other analyses) are discussed in the report, Examining the Continuum of Recruiting, Training, and Initial Assignment in the US Navy [49]. COL (Retired) Donald Tarter, a former USAREC Director and present contract administrator on three USAREC contracts (one of which provides civilians to augment the Army Reserve recruiting mission) was asked to comment on what he sees as important issues facing the Army in the future. In the interview process, he commented that the “up or out” policy in the service works against the needs of keeping a technically proficient force. He felt that rather than discharging at the E-5/E-6 level, the military should retain the individual if technical performance is satisfactory and place less emphasis on Non Commissioned Officer duties for technical personnel. Mr. Tarter also felt that the services could use more senior enlisted soldiers to relieve the shortage of Captains with recruiting experience. He felt that some good E-7/E-8 soldiers could be made Warrant Officers and serve as Recruiting Company Commanders. Presently, according to Mr. Tarter, Captains arrive at commands with little or no recruiting experience.

While the market has been changing, the military presence in the primary recruiting market has also declined. With the fall of Communism, the emphasis for the military was on downsizing. Recruiting goals were lowered because end strength had to be lowered in the downsizing effort. As a direct result of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC), many military bases were closed and individuals (both civilian employees and uniformed military) saw their jobs eliminated in reorganizations and other downsizing actions. LTC Harris’s report (Major Findings Affecting Recruiting: Making Them Work for the Army) attributes base closure and downsizing as some of the Major Factors Affecting Recruiting [39].

In addition to closing and realigning facilities, the services’ Research and Development (R&D) funding was reduced to a very low amount. Recruiting and retention incentives and pay did not keep pace with the tremendous increases being seen in the civilian sector. Prior to the downsizing, the military could attract as many individuals as it needed and was not concerned with the first signs of a problem: the attrition rate for enlistees in the mid- to late-1980’s hovered between 30-34 percent.

Job opportunities for youth in the 1980s were steadily improving, but job prospects for youth with no advanced training were limited. Additionally, the number of high school graduates that could afford or obtain funding to go to college was relatively low. This

created a demand-constrained recruiting environment where educational incentives could successfully lure high quality college-bound high school graduates into the military. Through the 1990s, job prospects improved for youth and alternative funding sources for college increased significantly, creating more competition for the same market that the military services was interested in.

With the downsizing and demand-constrained military recruiting environment, the services responded by increasing its requirements for the “high quality” high school graduate and cut to a very low percentage the percentage of “low quality” individuals. Research identified the individuals that exhibit undesirable characteristics in the military: higher attrition rates, lower ability to learn complex technical material, and indiscipline problems. The “low quality” recruit is an individual without a high school diploma, someone who scores below the average on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery, an individual with moral problems (as evidenced by a criminal record of arrests and/or convictions), and/or someone with minimal physical fitness capability. To increase the percentage of “high quality” recruits, the services increased physical fitness, mental aptitude, educational, and moral requirements. In 1980, 35 percent of the recruits were high quality, but the quota was increased to 74 percent in 1992.

With employment and college opportunities limited for a very large segment of the population, despite the growing inefficiency in recruiting and retention, this strategy worked well through most of the 1990s. Until Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, the military services were successful in meeting recruiting goals. However, while the military services were “rightsizing,” they were also not gathering and processing information on the changing youth market. Not only were more educational opportunities being presented to graduating high school seniors, students were also getting funding and opportunity to attend college. The go-to-college rate for high school seniors increased from 60 percent in 1990 to 66 percent in 1998 and continues to grow as more funding and opportunity is provided by a variety of sources. This increase in go-to-college rate took place despite an increase in the average real tuition costs and fees that rose by 50 percent from 1985 to 1995.

Certainly part of the increase in go-to-college rate was due to more teen employment opportunities, but another driving factor was the availability of low interest educational loans. While the military enjoyed the ability to constrain enlistments in the early 1980s, it also enjoyed a “competitive edge” in providing a significant source of money for college through the GI Bill, loan forgiveness programs, and the ability to give bonuses for hard-to-fill positions. With more money available to teens in the 1990’s, the competitive value of the military’s packages was severely eroded.

Employment opportunities for teens also have been improving. The civilian unemployment rate declined from 7.3 percent in 1992 to 4.7 percent in 1998 and even lower thereafter as the period of prosperity extended into the 2000’s.

With more opportunities in the prospering civilian economy, the military saw attrition rates grow from 30 to 34 percent in the mid- to late-1980’s to 37 percent in 1994 and

1995 and continue to grow thereafter. Attrition is also being experienced in the military's Delayed Entry Program (DEP), which allows an individual to sign a contract for military service and wait (delay entry) for up to 365 days before entering the military service (also known as "accessing"). DEP attrition has been steadily increasing over the past several years (for Fiscal Year 2000, the DEP attrition was around 18 percent). As stated by LTC Lee A. Harris [39], **"After talking to many young people, it is clear to this researcher that they perceive they will do better for themselves by going to college or getting a civilian job."** Obviously, the current generation of recruits is being driven by different factors than those that drove the generation of the drafted Army or initial all-voluntary Army era.

2.3 The Present Army Enlistment Production System Environment. Literature points to a growing list of problems that are putting increased pressure on the Army to attract, recruit, train, utilize, and retain qualified soldiers. Some of these problem areas are listed below and are discussed in the subsequent sections that follow.

➤ **Section 2.3.1 Changing Environment.**

- A strong economy and lagging compensation are making it increasingly difficult to recruit the needed soldiers.
- Generational effects within the military and civilian market cause difficulty in recruiting and retention.
- Military physical fitness standards are increasingly at odds with the changing physical fitness of the youth market.

➤ **Section 2.3.2 Unexpected Losses and Turnover.**

- Turnover of highly skilled soldiers and officers affects the ability of the Army to train and deploy cohesive units.
- Expanding missions are increasing operating tempos and time away from home.
 - Key positions can often go unfilled or remain gapped for months.

➤ **Section 2.3.3 Ineffective and Inefficient Systems.**

- Many present AEPS systems are inefficient and ineffective in dealing with contemporary issues.
- Some policies actually are counterproductive to an efficient and effective AEPS.
- Stove-piped, antiquated, and often inefficient personnel management processes make responsiveness to problems piecemeal and difficult.

➤ **Section 2.3.4 Influencers:**

- Army policy and actions have resulted in a growing number of disgruntled influencers.
- Disgruntled influencers are adding to the perception that the military is not an employer of choice.

2.3.1 Changing Environment. While the military was essentially preserving its present AEPS system while downsizing at the same time, it was essentially unconcerned with and incapable of identifying and responding to the changing recruiting environment. Although there have been some changes in the AEPS (most notably the all-voluntary Army), few real changes have been made in the philosophy of how the Army views its

entry-level soldiers. However, literature indicates that even with modifications, the present model no longer will satisfy the needs of the Army and will not accommodate the capabilities, desires, and expectations of a new generation.

As stated in a 1999 RAND Corporation Report [3], **“...there are some indications that the current situation to some extent reflects ongoing and permanent changes in the civilian market. These changes suggest that the military will increasingly be competing with civilian post-secondary education institutions and subsequent skilled civilian employment for high quality youth.”** It is clear to the study team that modifications of the existing draft-era system will not solve the present problem. Worse still, if predicted research results come to pass, the present (or even modified) system will continue to experience further decline.

The Defense LINK News Transcript, “Special Briefing on Army Recruiting Results” presents a transcript of a presentation made by Thomas E. White, Secretary of the Army [88]. Major General Dennis D. Cavin, commanding general of the US Army Recruiting Command was one of the distinguished attendees. One of the significant items reported was that the Army achieved one hundred percent of its active component recruiting missions for 2001 (the Army reserve component and National Guard were reported to be on track to meet their recruiting goals as well). Retention goals for 2001 were also achieved for all three Army components. The presentation and follow-on question and answers provided some additional information regarding that success:

- Total recruiting leads (including internet leads) were significantly higher than the previous year.
- The Delayed Entry pool was built during 2001.
- Youth unemployment contributed to the success.
- There are about 1.4 million men in the primary recruiting audience.
- The Army is experiencing the highest number of individuals going from high school to post-secondary/college – or post-secondary schooling.
- The propensity to join the Armed Forces is the lowest that it has been in 10 years.
- The US government provides over \$20 Billion a year in student loans with no requirement for service (as is required to obtain the GI Bill).
- The Army has developed a new message (An Army of One) and has tuned up its approach to the present generation of potential recruits.

Not discussed with the changes that the Army made, and undoubtedly a significant factor in its recruiting success, was the increase in resources: more recruiters, more advertising money, and a somewhat smaller mission (Active Army goals were 80,000 in 2000 versus 75,800 in 2001).

Over time, the military has learned through past research to tie resource levels to recruiting difficulty. Under this paradigm, decreasing unemployment, decreasing youth propensity, declining prime market population, and other variables were successfully shown to be related to the need for increased recruiting resources. However, until recently, with the period of drawdown, the resources were decreased because the military was not as interested in entry levels as it was in reducing the end strength. This resource paradigm persists to the present time.

Although the different generations will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter, it is important to note that literature refers to the existence of several distinct generations, with each generation having distinctive characteristics. The literature has names for the different generations. The generation that provided the massive number of soldiers during World War II is now referred to as the “Matures” (birth dates prior to 1946). The generation that followed World War II (1946 to 1964) is referred to as the “Boomers.” The next generation, the Generation X (also known as “Xers”) was born during the period of 1965 through 1978. The children of the Xers (born between 1979 and 1985) are called the “Echo Boomer” generation because of the large increase in population similar to that of the Boomer generation.

While the military maintains a process that essentially treats individuals as a commodity, prospective recruits have expectations that increasingly are not being met. Unlike the draft era, where drafted individuals had few choices due to the forced conscription, present generations have a growing number of choices available to them. **“Generation Xers are providing employers in the job market not only with higher levels of education, but also the highest technology skills and knowledge. Xers are seeking sophisticated and technologically advanced work, adjustable pay structures, fewer boundaries, and more flexibility in how and where the work is DONE”** [sic] (Source: Civilian Workforce 2020: Strategies for Modernizing Human Resources Management in the Department of the Navy [12]).

As the military was losing its competitive edge because of a growing economy and more teen opportunity, the mindset of the target population was also radically changing. Current research shows the emergence of “generational changes.” These generational changes are present not only between the market and the military, but are present within the services and market as well. A recent report (Generations Apart: Xers and Boomers in the Officer Corps [89]) states, **“Simply put, today’s senior officers do not understand today’s junior officers or their perspectives. Senior officers think they understand the world of lieutenants and captains, but many junior officers and others are convinced that they do not. Junior officers have become persuaded in increasing numbers that the Army’s senior leadership is not connected to the reality of the trenches.”** This “generational difference” has been found to be present in individuals that are at the same career point but differ in age by only ten years. If these generational differences due to only a decade of time produce such profound effects, then it should not be a surprise to find out that the entry-level market has a profoundly different view of military service than the leadership or even the mid-career individuals.

Unless the trans-generational changes are taken into account in dealing with the present AEPS dilemma, analyses and policy will be based on data that do not adequately capture the relative variables. Several observations regarding the generational differences are appropriate to understand the difficulty of dealing with the present problem.

- Senior leadership generally comes from the “Matures” and “Boomers.” Even these groups have differences in outlook.

- Junior leadership is mostly in the “Xers.” The services are having a difficult time retaining this group [89].
- The entry-level market is shifting to the “Echo Boomers” and the growing fifth generation that is sometimes referred to as the Generation Y. Yankelovich [93] calls this the Me dot two – Me.2 generation because of its focus on “me”. This generation differs from the previous ones and has not been as thoroughly evaluated as the Xer Generation.
- Economic research uses past data to predict future behavior. Past data does not take into account the generational changes. Thus, for example, econometric models that predict higher yields on higher enlisted bonuses for a future generation are based on a generation that is no longer the entry-level generation.
- Trans-generational changes are going to continue to adversely affect recruiting. There does not seem to be much interest shown in the literature on understanding this and looking for effective means to deal with the changes.

Literature also points to a source of the current recruiting, training, utilization, and retention problem faced by the military services: there is a significant change taking place in the target market. The target market is rapidly changing as the economy, educational systems, culture, demographics, teen health, and youth employment expectations change. According to a Point Paper prepared by Jim Larsen [52], **“Today’s teenager is less prepared for individual IET (Initial Entry Training) due to over fatness, under fitness, malnutrition (more colas, less milk; more fries, less vegetables), and less adult contact (Source: Center for Disease Control (CDC). Dramatically fewer veterans are in the direct influencer population as the WW II veterans die and age (Source: Veteran’s Administration (VA)). Markets are increasingly fragmenting (Alaska’s solution may not be Missouri’s solution).”**

Further research supports the observation on the physical fitness of the youth market. The Army Research Institute paper, Modeling the Individual Enlistment Decision: Analysis of the Career Decision Survey [70] states, **“The physical rigors of basic training are well known to youth and may deter enlistment for those who are uncertain of their abilities to stand up to them.”** This decline in physical fitness has already affected the military’s ability to recruit and retain highly technical individuals who are subjected to physical standards that increasingly are not being met by the youth population.

Indeed, as discussed in Martin Walker’s Army Enlisted Attrition Study – Phase II Unit Attrition study [83], the percent of soldiers requiring physical waivers increased from one percent in Fiscal Year 1988 to six percent in Fiscal Year 1998. His findings show that soldiers who were granted physical waivers had higher training attrition than those who did not require physical waivers. Attrition, as discussed in Martin Walker’s report, is affected by factors in addition to physical fitness. Two groups of soldiers have attrition rates of at least 50 percent: soldiers with less than a high school diploma and female soldiers. The percentage of soldiers in these categories has grown steadily over the 1990’s.

2.3.2 Unexpected Losses and Turnover. Perhaps one of the most significant differences in the draft era and the all-volunteer era is the completion of an enlistment contract. This contract specifies a number of obligations that the enlistee agrees to (such as number of years of service, the type of training that will be received, and the job rating that the individual will receive upon completion of training). In exchange for this commitment on the part of the enlistee, the Military may agree to provide certain incentives (such as a recruitment bonus that is paid after completion of the training, educational programs such as the Army College Fund or the GI Bill). It is important to note, however, that despite the contract that specifies the enlistee's term of service, incentives, position, training, and other conditions, a significant number of enlistees fail for a variety of reasons to complete their contracted service obligation.

Attrition occurs at all stages of the AEPS. USMEPCOM briefings indicate that about 50 percent of the prospects that it processes are lost prior to contracting. Once contracted, losses occur while the recruit is in the Delayed Entry Program. Additional losses occur from the training base and the Operational Forces. According to Martin Walker's report, twelve percent of the enlistees are separated during the first six months of their enlistment (e.g., while in the training base), while the majority of first-term losses occur after Initial Entry Training while soldiers are serving in Army units. Clearly, this has resource implications for the AEPS presently and will be a critical problem as the Army transitions to the Objective Force that will require a very large amount of technical enablers.

To counter the growing inability to attract and retain sufficient numbers of high quality soldiers, the Army has come up with a variety of incentives and contract requirements. However, these incentives and contract requirements carry special obligations for the enlistee. The literature points out that the youth market has concerns over the length of commitment: **"Concern about the length of the enlistment commitment seems to deter some from expressing interest in military service"** (Source: Modeling the Individual Enlistment Decision: Analysis of the Career Decision Survey [70]).

With respect to the characteristics of the youth market, it is clear that some of the provisions in the enlistment contract run counter to the youth concerns. This could explain why individuals who sign contracts for these incentives do not necessarily complete their contracted service obligation. Some of the characteristics of the enlistment contract are listed below.

- A higher bonus amount requires a longer term of enlistment.
- Bonuses are given AFTER training is completed.
- Since the recruiter is not supposed to talk about specific job choices (the recruiter "sells the Army"), the very short counseling session for a specific job, term, and other contract conditions is not under the control of the recruiter.
- Positions that require more training also require longer terms of enlistment.

Compounding the problem of turnover is the lack of consideration for the individual soldier's needs. The 15 January 2002 issue of the Defense Beat ("The Personnel Problem" by Katherine McIntire Peters) [65] discusses some of the problems with the Army's personnel system: **"Yet reforming the antiquated system for managing**

people – a system that treats individuals as interchangeable parts of a vast military machine, regardless of the unique skills or contributions they make – is possibly the single most important challenge facing the military today.” This paper goes on to explain that the current system undermines unit cohesion and leadership, two of the foundational aspects of the Objective Force (indeed, foundational aspects of today’s system as well). The paper also explains that individual service members are managed individually and not as a critical part of the units they serve in. This results in the inability to forge the relationships with peers and leaders to sustain them physically and in combat. Finally, this paper discusses emphasis leadership micromanagement to achieve zero-defects and overly cautious conservatism to preserve leadership careers. These, in turn, have contributed to the loss of mid-grade officers and increase in assignments turned down by officers

Another reason for losses of skilled soldiers may be caused by Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB), the major incentive that the Army uses to attract the high quality recruit. The GI Bill concept is an extension of the concept of the “Citizen Soldier” that evolved when the country drafted individuals and then extended educational benefits to help to introduce the soldiers back into the civilian world. The system was not designed to obtain or retain highly skilled individuals. Rather, it was designed to rapidly get a large number of untrained individuals trained to an acceptable level of performance. Ironically, the Montgomery GI Bill educational benefits, one of the military’s premier incentives, causes individuals to leave the service shortly after reaching a level of proficiency that the military needs. According to a 1999 RAND report (Attracting College Bound Youth Into the Military: Toward the Development of New Recruiting Policy Options [3]), **“The fact that most MGIB participants obtain their education after separating implies that the military does not reap an active duty return on the most important college program that it offers.”** The inability to reap an active duty return on the college program obviously has implications for the military’s ability to retain highly trained soldiers.

Under the present AEPS concepts, there were few provisions for lateral entry of enlisted soldiers. Although there has been a program (Stripes for Skills), the Army does not stress the capability. However, the military did accommodate the lateral entry of some highly technical skills (e.g., medical doctors, chaplains, and legal), but these individuals entered as officers. The same philosophy now results in tremendous turnover of highly trained technical personnel and an inability for those with technical skills to enter the enlisted ranks.

This turnover not only adversely affects the recruiting process that must replace these soldiers (from whom very little return on investment is realized), it increases the requirements on the training, base, and generally results in loss of capability in the Operating Forces. The turnover also diverts more resources away from the Operating Force into the recruiting and training processes. This will be critical for the Objective Force as the Army looks for “bill payers” for its very large and extensive list of technical enablers. Additionally, it is unlikely that the Army will be able to sustain the high level of human and other resources that have been diverted to recruiting and training missions.

In a somewhat dated news release, "New CSA: Talking About the Future" [42], the Army's Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer spoke about the "bill payer" in historical terms: **"If you look at the Army, what you find is that there are not many ways to pay bills other than [by reducing] end strength."** General Reimer indicated that by the end of the drawdown (about 1996), the Army's active-duty strength would be 495,000, with some within the Department of Defense talking of further reductions. According to a 4 September 2001 Defense Link News Transcript made by Major General Dennis D. Cavin, Commander of the US Army Recruiting Command, active duty end strength is at 480,000. What is not indicated in these numbers is the parallel downsizing in the civilian workforce of the Department of the Army. Certainly, recent history indicates that the financial prospects of the Army to maintain its current end strength and conduct such massive modernization will present formidable arguments for using force structure reductions achieved through "smaller footprints."

2.3.3 Ineffective and Inefficient Systems. According to the Government Audit Organization (GAO) [31], the Army recently went to the past solution set to solve its recent recruiting dilemma by increasing the number of recruiters, substantially increasing advertising expenditures, and increased the number and amount of bonuses. However, according to the same report, **"the services do not yet know which of their recruiting initiatives works best."** The report also states, **"Because so little time has passed since the services have begun to respond to their recruiting problems, they cannot yet access the long-term success of their efforts...DOD does not know the extent to which the services might be competing with each other for the same potential recruits."**

Thus, not only are the services increasingly competing with industry for the same high quality individuals, they are also competing among themselves. Clearly, this has implications in the growing expectations of the market place for increased bonuses and other incentives. However, as discussed in the GAO report [31], **"...DOD does not have the tools at present to determine whether the service's recruiting and retention efforts will be successful in the long term."** In the long term, the Objective Force will impose even more requirements on the recruiting market. The inability to evaluate the long term effects of recruiting, training, and retention on the Objective Force will have profound negative effects on the ability of the Objective Force to achieve its designed objectives.

In addition to the expressions of uncertainty of the effectiveness of the recent initiatives, there have been expressions of concern for the military's ability to retain its present level of resources. COL Greg Parlier, USAREC Director of Program and Analysis stated in a December 2000 interview [49], **"We cannot sustain the level of resources available in FY00...we need to evaluate what worked/did not work."** When the AEPCO senior analysts interviewed Navy Captain Steve Conn, US Navy Head of Enlisted Strength and Advancement Plans, he stated [49] that **"The Navy should civilianize the recruiting force. It does not make sense that fleet resources are taken away to be used on a job**

for which recruiters have no background (and the experience provides no benefit when they return to the fleet)."

The current process still presents to the enlistment candidate a prioritized list of Army needs based on the candidate's performance on the ASVAB. The current process also includes an organization that is not directly under the control of the individual service: the Military Enlisted Processing Command. The MEPCOM, a Department of Defense agency, is charged with administering the ASVAB and an occupational physical examination. Part of the processing of the prospective recruits includes a discussion with a guidance counselor and completion of administrative procedures (e.g., completing background, medical, and other information).

Although there have been some modifications to the processes, the basic philosophy of recruiting, selection, classification, and qualification remains the same. However, these same processes are now hindering the military according to an Army War College Study (US Army Recruiting: Problems and Fixes [47]): **"Many of these turn-offs can be attributed to the extraordinary waiting time to talk with a guidance counselor and then to complete voluminous administrative requirements...Would IBM or any other major employer treat potential employees in this manner?"** On the subject of outdated procedures and processes, this same report expresses what many of the individuals expressed during the interviews: **"The real problem might rest with the Army's inability to develop a holistic accession strategy, to institute program modernization, to provide outstanding customer service, and to embrace change of outdated procedures."**

The AEPCO study team found in a very small interview of recruiters that the Army and Navy recruiters felt that the use of MEPCOM for processing recruits is a constant source of conflict in processing. USAREC also completed a study: Leading Edge Recruiting Station and published a report. Some of the findings of the study are:

- New technology can drive greater efficiency in the production system;
- Utilizing the Intranet to disseminate information and to process applicants can help the process at many levels and the possibilities are almost endless; and
- Recruiters look for the day when they can select a job and process the applicant without having to use the Military Enlistment Processing Station (MEPS) facility.

The antiquated personnel system is not peculiar to the Army. Similar observations have been made regarding the Navy. As discussed by US Navy Commander Dennis Murphy in an Associated Press article by Dean Visser [82], **"For too long we've treated sailors as a commodity. Now we have to focus on treating them as a skilled work force."** The Army also has to come to grips with the difference in the expectations of the present and future market and what their competitors have to offer. Simply changing the present inefficient, ineffective system for the Objective Force recruits will not make the AEPS any more effective or efficient.

The concern for human resources should not be focused exclusively on the uniformed services. Increasingly, civilians are being employed to conduct supporting operations

that heretofore have been primarily military functions. Indeed, the Objective Force concept calls for more split-based operations to reduce the footprint in the Area of Operations. With the split-based operation concept, the ability to use non-uniformed support (including contractor) resources will increase. Additionally, the civilian workforce allows the military an opportunity to obtain the technical support services from the civilian sector that might not be available to the uniformed services (or which might excessive time and resources to train).

Despite these and other advantages of having civilian (non-uniformed) support services, the present personnel system that administers this critical AEPS process is also inadequate for present and future military needs. The Department of the Navy, for example, has begun to look at its personnel system to determine actions that should be taken to attract and retain a quality civilian workforce capable of providing the human capital needed for the Navy to achieve mission excellence in the year 2020. DON commissioned the National Academy of Public Administration's Center for Human Resources Management (CHRM) to analyze the Department's civilian personnel system. In its 18 August 2000 report, CHRM reported [12], **"The Navy's current human resources (HR) system (laws, rules, technology, structure, and competence) is inadequate to operate in the world of 2020. If the system's inadequacies are not addressed, the Navy can expect further degradation of its capability to perform needed tasks and ensure continuation of its military superiority."** The report goes on to state, **"The DON workforce is becoming increasingly technical and scientific. This creates the greatest demand in the segment of the labor market with the greatest shortage. DON has not been able to compete effectively for top-level talent in the current setting, and competition is likely to get more intense in the future."** These findings certainly hold for the Army as well as the Navy.

2.3.4 Influencers. The Army is experiencing growing difficulty in recruiting and retaining quality soldiers as evidenced by the report by LTC Lee A. Harris [39]: **"Other external factors include the impact of a strong economy, base closure/downsizing, recruiting market & advertisement, less competitive Army enlistment incentives, benefits and pay, an outdated GI Bill, public's relationship and education of the Army, and unofficial recruiters also impact on young people's decision to enlist."**

Unofficial recruiters include influencers and service members that leave the Army because of some dissatisfaction. Additional research shows a growing dissatisfaction of soldiers and their families. As stated in the LTC Harris paper [39], **"A surprising number of active-duty soldiers and their family members are not enthusiastically promoting the Army as a good career choice. I was repeatedly told by them that they do not think it is a great place at this time."** With the decrease in the number of individuals having military service background, the negative effects of these "Unofficial Recruiters" could be profound.

The military's haste in achieving the force reduction has had a profound effect on its ability to recruit and retain the quality soldier. Major A. Christopher St. Jean (US Army) prepared a report [69] on the military drawdown that started in 1991 and some effects

that it has had (Managing the Drawdown's Human Side). His research also considered corporate America's downsizing efforts and effects. His report contains one finding that has impact on the AEPS: **"Another significant problem is the perceived breach of faith between soldiers and their contracts with the Army. During a time of ever-increasing OPTEMPO, military benefits continue to erode. Changes have been made after soldiers have already agreed on and signed contracts. There are many examples of contracts being waived and rules being changed to meet reduction quotas or to recognize savings by paring benefits. Examples range from not bringing individuals onto active duty as promised, releasing individuals from active duty obligations, shortening retention control points (RCPs) and the increasing use of military manpower to compensate for the loss of base contractor support, resulting in soldiers performing details other than those related to the military occupational specialty they enlisted to learn. The Army has broken with what was a traditionally valued and prestigious source of pride and job security by announcing that for the first time in its history, Regular Army officers are also being considered for separation and reduction in forced. As contract rules change, what makes a successful Army career is constantly being redefined by those who remain. At the same time, incentives for new recruits to make the Army a career are being reduced significantly."** Clearly, the recruit market was directly influenced by the disgruntled individuals that were thus treated.

The decline in the direct influencer population and a growing distrust of institutions also has had a negative impact on the military as a source of employment. As stated in the June 1999 edition of the Edison Herald [44], **"Some students at Edison refused to take the (ASVAB) because they are afraid they might be drafted into the Army. Some didn't take it because they didn't get a chance to, and others weren't interested."** Clearly, the market is changing and has some attitudes toward military service that simply are not true in this era.

Clearly, not only has the recruiting market changed, but the influencers of that market have also changed. The number of individuals with military experience has declined over the years and this decline means that the influence of service to the country is not being emphasized to today's youth. Additionally, the youth of today are being encouraged to attend college, and colleges are accommodating them at a growing rate. In his report [39], LTC Lee A. Harris states, **"Keeping influencers connected to the Army, through educating them about America's National Military Strategy, the Army's role and missions, and the benefits that it provides young people, will help them view the Army in a more positive light."**

To gain a better understanding of the High School market, the AEPCO study team conducted short interviews of counselors in 6 cities (three in Andover, MA and three in Indianapolis, Indiana). The AEPCO study team wanted to see what this very important group of influencers thought about military service. While not a scientific survey, the interviews provided several insights (see [49]).

- A large percentage of students plan to go to college upon graduation from High School.

- High School students are not very interested in taking the ASVAB (since colleges do not use it for admission).
- The tests that counselors push are the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) for juniors and seniors and the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test (PSAT) for sophomores.
- Schools do provide an opportunity for the Career Exploration Program, administered by USMEPCOM, but typically have few students participate due to disinterest in the test.
- The counselors have problems in scheduling more tests since the schools have to administer mandated graduation-qualification tests. There is not much time left in student schedules for more tests after the qualification tests, the PSAT, and SAT are administered.
- The most prevalent comment that the study team heard was that the counselors either did not see military recruiters much or they did not know the difference between the Service Recruiter uniforms.
- Many of the counselors were not aware of incentive programs offered by the Military Services (some knew that the Services had some kind of education and bonus program, but were not aware of any specific points).
- Frequently, a single counselor was designated as the "Military Liaison." The study team felt that this was a contributing factor for the lack of knowledge about the Military.

2.4 Summary. The AEPS is a very complex system that was put together in an era where the environmental conditions were significantly different from today. The system was built upon the basis of a "conscripted" Army of untrained individuals that were not expected to remain in the Army for a career. Although some changes have been made to convert the Army to an all-voluntary force, many of the processes remain essentially the same. As the need for higher quality technically skilled soldiers increased, the Army has increased incentives, human resources, and financial resources. Although these, and other policy changes have resulted in some marginal improvements, the AEPS is experiencing premature losses throughout the entire system. These losses exacerbate the problem of turnover of the highly valued quality recruits.

Studies have shown that lower mental capability individuals have a higher propensity to serve in the military. There have been periods during which Army enlistment standards were effectively lower. However, recent research has shown that lower quality can only be had at the cost of a corresponding decline in enlisted job performance. This means that decreasing personnel quality to meet future recruiting goals will result in declining job performance. Obviously, the implications of the Objective Force requirement for higher quality soldiers will present a critical recruiting challenge to attract high quality youth.

One conclusion based on analysis of the AEPS literature seems to be unavoidable: the recruiting, training, and retention policies that were essentially put into place during the draft era when the military took in thousands of uneducated or undereducated individuals can no longer simply be adapted to today's complex situation. Several problems of the AEPS have been documented in this chapter are listed below.

- The AEPS was developed for a generation and conditions that will not exist when the Army fields the Objective Force.
- The AEPS is inefficient and ineffective.
- The personnel system is fragmented and undermines unit cohesion and leadership.
- The AEPS has many aspects that are turn-offs to youth.
- There already is a lack of full funding for some programs despite recent increases in recruiting resources.
- Present incentives already run counter to the Army's growing technical needs.
- Policies (e.g., weight, retention, performance, others) run counter to the needs of the Army to retain skilled technical individuals.
- The solution to recruiting problems of increasing resources rather than making significant changes to the AEPS will compete with the needs of the Objective Force.
- It is doubtful if the Army can sustain its present level of AEPS resources through the Objective Force years.
- Competition for funds for the Objective Force will put pressure on the AEPS to reduce human and other resources as "bill payers" for the new technology required of the Objective Force.
- Traditional "fixes" to AEPS problems do not produce sustained improvement and may actually exacerbate the problem.

The present AEPS has significant resource implications. As the Army starts to transition to the Objective Force with all of its technological enablers, the resource implications for the Objective Force will be even more severe. To make the future system more effective and efficient, methods other than the traditional solutions have to be used.

This chapter has discussed some of the past and present situations that have already put stress on the APES. However, the Objective Force will have to be attractive to an entirely new generation. The next chapter will review the results of generational literature to discuss some of the implications of the generation from which the Objective Force will seek its recruits.

3. Some Future Youth Market Implications for the Objective Force

3.1 Introduction. The results of a Naval Postgraduate School thesis titled The Delayed Entry Program and Generation Y [6] illustrates the generational differences that the AEPS is presently dealing with. This study looked at the children of the Generation X (those born between 1965 and 1978). The children of Generation X are referred to in the thesis as Generation Y (they are also known as the “millennials”). The study found that youth of Generation Y are more culturally diverse than previous generations. They are more technologically advanced and very computer literate, having grown up using the Internet extensively for education and for entertainment. They also have a higher regard for education than the youth of twenty years ago. Generation Y youth have more conservative views regarding family values and are extremely optimistic about achieving their economic goals. The study also revealed that Generation Y youth have serious needs for stability in the work environment, working relations, and enjoying their job. These attributes are also more important than pay to the Generation Y youth.

In addition to a changing youth population, the Army will make changes in its use of Objective Force soldiers. Chapter 1 of this report discussed some of the Objective Force soldier capabilities. These changes in soldier capabilities, the changing concepts for rapid deployment of soldiers, and budgetary pressures that will undoubtedly cause the military to seek “bill payers” for all of the technological enablers for the Objective Force will almost certainly cause the military to have to rethink some of the issues that have been dormant for some time.

Some of the other differences that the AEPS will encounter in the youth population include gender, race/ethnicity, and greater diversity due to increased immigration. Gender differences, for example, in soldier performance, attrition, and training have already come under closer scrutiny by the Army. Additionally, minority representation and equal opportunity have been prime considerations for the military. However, expected changes in the racial/ethnic composition of the population could put pressure on the need for more accommodations. Changes in the diversity of the population are expected to continue as the result of recent changes in immigration rules that result in unprecedented growth in immigrants.

The Army should also understand that the changing youth market will continue to put pressure on it to innovate to be able to compete with a growing market for the very youth that it prizes. Competition is already immense and will only grow as industry, colleges, and other institutions change their procedures and processes to attract and retain the youth of tomorrow. As stated by Major General Dennis D. Cavin (“Soldiers: The Future of ADA” [11]), **“Even major corporations that pass out stock options instead of MREs [Meals Ready to Eat] are having trouble meeting their recruiting goals in today’s booming job market, but Army recruiters say the Army’s recruiting problem goes beyond career perks and pay comparability. ‘Too many American youths,’ they say, ‘feel that national defense isn’t their responsibility, but a job they can pay someone else to do.’”** Clearly, the attitude of youth toward military service is an important aspect that affects, and will continue to affect, the AEPS.

This chapter will explore some of the causes for present changes in the population and expected changes that will take place as the Army transitions to the Objective Force. The sections that follow will review some of the changes that the Objective Force will have to contend with due to generational, gender, race/ethnicity, and immigration effects. This will facilitate the ability to discuss Objective Force AEPS issues in the next chapter of this report.

3.2 Youth Generational Differences. It is becoming apparent in the literature on generational changes that the generation upon which the present AEPS was built no longer has the same values, motivations, and concerns as the present generation. Whereas many people have heard the term “Generation X” (sometimes called “Xers”), the military has not effectively come to grips with this generation let alone coming to grips with the generations that follow. These new generations will be the primary recruiting market from which the Objective Force soldiers will be recruited. Their feelings, aspirations, hopes, desires, and other conditions will affect their decision to enlist or not enlist into the military service. The literature talks about four distinctly different generations and alludes to a fifth generation. As summarized in Table 3 (source: Monitor 2000 [93]), each generation brings with it a different set of attributes. Following a summary of some of the attributes of the generations is the results of a survey of individuals toward some Army questions.

What Table 3 shows is that the different generations have different outlooks. Whereas the Matures value duty, victory, and teamwork (no doubt influenced by their sense of patriotism arising from World War II), the sense of what is important changed through the Echo Boomers. Each generation placed more importance on making money now. Each generation saw the military in less favorable terms and felt that the military recruiters were less trustworthy. Finally, the declining trend toward the view of the military also extended to the Army College Fund (ACF).

Table 3. Generational Differences

| | Matures | Boomers | Xers | Echo Boomer |
|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|--------------|--------------------|
| Birth Dates | 1945 and prior | 1946 – 1964 | 1965 - 1978 | 1979 – 1985 |
| Outlook | Duty | Individuality | Diversity | Uniqueness |
| | Victory | Youth | Savvy | Digitization |
| | Teamwork | Self-Absorbed | Entrepreneur | Self-Invention |
| Make money now | 14% | 33% | 40% | 51% |
| Army Survey: | | | | |
| Positive to Army | 64% | 47% | 41% | 35% |
| Would enlist Army | 56% | 45% | 43% | 23% |
| Have fun in Army | 26% | 17% | 14% | 13% |
| Army College Prep | 60% | 47% | 42% | 32% |
| Believe Recruiter | 24% | 17% | 18% | 14% |
| | | | | |
| Population | | 78 Million | 53 Million | 86 Million |

Note from Table 3 that the Echo Boomers had the smallest percent of individuals that feel that they can have fun in the Army. However, 70 percent of the youth feel that having fun is important and a sign of success and accomplishment if they were an adult. 92 percent of the youth feel that a good sense of humor is important.

Another observation from Table 3 shows why the last column is referred to as the “Echo Boomer” generation. The surge in population of this group is larger than the original “Boomers.” The increase in the Echo Boomer population should be good news for military recruiting. However, there are a number of things that mitigate the situation. First, for the 9-17 year-old group, a very large percentage of the population wants to go to college or a university following graduation (86% white and African-American and 90 % Hispanic). Additionally, a growing percentage of the youth does not meet the physical fitness, high school graduation, and mental standards of the military. Increasingly, physical fitness is less of a consideration to a youth population. Contributing to this problem is one characteristic of the youth population that they feel that they should look good on their own terms (“No more pinching Inches”).

One of the pieces of information that Table 3 does not reveal is that the growth of the present population has been fueled by a significant growth in immigration and the children of immigrants. Whereas this growth might be the cause of celebration as the recruiting community sees an increase in its market potential, it will be shown in subsequent sections of this chapter that this growth will present even more challenges to the AEPS to recruit, train, and retain the growing quality soldiers required of the Objective Force. Immigration will be addressed in more detail below.

Although the Matures and Boomers are not in the market for enlistment, the information in Table 3 shows that the older generations have a much more positive view of the Army as compared to the Echo Boomers who are in the primary recruiting market. The Xers do not share the same sense of motivation that previous generations had. According to Yankelovich [93], some of the characteristics of Xers are:

- Relationships are important to them;
- They lack skills and ability to have true/meaningful relationships;
- They are visually oriented;
- They lack the ability to communicate feelings;
- They are skeptical of organized institutions;
- “Paying Dues” is an outdated concept to them;
- Paying them short-term dividends is key to their motivation (45% of 18-25 year olds plan to stay on current job two years or less);
- They are wary of commitment;
- They favor short-term commitments to small-scale projects with definable objectives and ending dates;
- They expect change; routine is out-of-date (choice is essential for 86% of 18-25 year olds);
- They need innovation and are easily affected by gimmicks;
- They eagerly embrace technology; and
- They have no respect for positional authority; respect must be earned by treatment.

When asked about their view of the military in general (source: Monitor 2000 [93]), the younger generation feels:

- It's a 24/7/365 lifestyle, not a 9 to 5 job;
- If you make a mistake, you cannot move on after 6 months;
- You have less control over broad areas of your life; and
- You can be ordered to engage in dangerous activities.

The perspective about the military is also important. The Monitor 2000 contains a picture of the Army's mainline tank, the M1 Abrams with the following caption:

"One M1 tank: \$280 million; one loaded machine gun: \$65,000; one standard military plunger: \$1,000; cleaning the urinal with a toothbrush because there was a small scuff on your shoe: priceless."

Robert Wendover reports in the September/October issue of GenTrends [85] that the youth of today are growing up with expectations that are based on their lifestyles. Some of the conditions that are shaping the expectations of youth are listed below.

- They are growing up in a world that is experiencing tremendous affluence.
- Their presence in the workplace is in high demand and the opportunities for moving from job to job are endless.
- They can communicate continuously with friends and associates.
- Palm Pilots allow them to take notes without a pad of paper.
- The Internet allows them to purchase almost anything without leaving home.
- They have developed a positive outlook and desire for improving the world.
- They belong to the most inclusive generation the world has seen.
- One in three youth is a minority; one in four comes from a single parent family.
- Values about right and wrong have been subjected to a continual stream of conflicting messages.

Monitor 2000 [93] also discusses the "Millennial Generation" (14 years-old and younger). These are the individuals that will make up a primary recruiting market for the Objective Force. According to Monitor 2000, some of the characteristics of this generation include:

- Materialistic;
- Selfish;
- Disrespectful;
- Aware of the world;
- Technology literate;
- Growing up fast; and
- No good role models to look towards.

Obviously, these characteristics have some rather profound consequences on the military of the future. Being technologically literate, these individuals will expect a military that also uses high technology. The Objective Force certainly should meet this expectation since one of its design principles is the use of an extensive array of technology enablers.

The disrespectful, selfish, and the lack of good role models to look towards could cause problems with leadership styles. These attributes, however, could be the topic of training sessions (not necessarily to correct the attributes, but rather to inform the individuals of consequences of inappropriate behavior).

Clearly, the importance of the role of the military in today's society has changed radically over the generations. The Matures saw patriotism and military service as a very important requirement for the national security that was being threatened by foreign governments in general and Communism in specific. They were accustomed to the draft and compulsory military service. On the other extreme, the Echo Boomers see no real global threat to the United States. Compulsory military service was replaced with the all-voluntary military and the number of veterans and their influence on youth has steadily declined. Whereas military service in the past was a way to get technical job training and skills and a way to finance civilian education through various versions of the GI Bill, the Echo Boomers now see the pursuit of financial gains as a primary motivating factor.

The youth generation is also increasingly independent. 75 percent of the 9-11 year-olds fix their own meals and 81 percent of the 9-17 year-olds feel that being in control of your own life is important.

3.3 Gender Differences and the Military. Not only are there generational differences in the youth market that affect the military, there are gender differences that the military has already dealt with and will continue to have to contend with. Whereas the issue of the role of women in the military has had a long history, the issue of gender-integrated training is relatively recent. The present national policy limits the role of women in the Army to non-combat, support functions. Under the concept of train as we fight, the Army has integrated women into Initial Entry Training. This gender-integration has been the subject of debate and scrutiny over the past decade.

In December 1997, the Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues completed a report and furnished it then Secretary of Defense William Cohen. This report has become known as the Kassebaum Baker report, which was named after the leader of the advisory panel's chairman, the former Kansas Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker. According to American Forces Information Service News Articles [38] titled, "DoD Accepts Gender-Integration Recommendations," the Kassebaum Baker Panel recommendations that were accepted by the military included:

- More female recruiters and trainers;
- Better selection processes for trainers and more clarity in training authority;
- Institute training to produce professional relationships between grades;
- Place more emphasis on core military values;
- Develop more consistent training standards between the genders; and
- Put more emphasis on patriotism and the challenge of the military in its advertising.

Although the Kassebaum Baker report also recommended segregation of the sexes in recruit training and that men and women should be housed in separate barracks, the

gender-integrated basic training continues to this day. Perhaps to address the argument that gender-integrated training resulted in lowering physical standards for all, then Secretary of Defense William Cohen also wanted the services to make basic training tougher. Other analysis [43] shows that this resulted in higher Initial Entry Training (IET) losses due to increased stress fractures and other medical problems. **“Army experience, for instance, shows that if trained to the same standards long expected of males, females suffer disproportionate rates of injury....Those who run the fastest, throw the farthest, and have the least difficulty with the heavy lifting remain overwhelmingly male.”**

One of the arguments against gender-integration involves the differences in the physiology of men and women. According to a paper written by Maggie Gallagher, Universal Press Syndicate [24], **“The average female recruit is almost 5 inches shorter and 31 pounds lighter, with just 55 percent of the upper-body strength and 72 percent of the lower-body strength, than the average male. And despite our technological advances, we’ve not found a way to eliminate the need for strength in warriors, especially warrior grunts.”** Obviously, this issue will have an impact on the Objective Force support function footprint and design of enablers since women are concentrated in the CSS Military Occupational Specialties.

Other gender-integration literature discusses several implication of gender-integrated training (see [68], for example). Some of these implications that the literature discusses are listed below.

- Physical standards have been lowered because women cannot match men’s standards.
- Accusations of sexual harassment against trainers erode discipline.
- Gender Integrated training hurts teamwork and unit cohesion during training.
- Some Army drill sergeants complain about inordinate amount of time they spend disciplining recruits for male-female misconduct.
- Gender-integrated units have more confusion and less cohesion at the operational training unit level.

In June 1993, TRADOC Commander commissioned an Army Research Institute study of the attitudes of soldiers-in-training and training cadre during squad-level gender-integrated Basic Combat Training in Combat Support Services Military Occupational Specialties. The study was completed in 1995 (see [58] and [59]). Other gender-integrated studies include a 1996 Government Accounting Office (GAO) study, Basic Training: Services are Using a Variety of Approaches to Gender Integration [25], and a 1999 Congressional Commission on Training and Gender Related Issues [5 & 18].

The most recent effort to look at gender-integrated training was commissioned by the TRADOC commander. The time frame for completion of the study and to report the findings was November 2001 to April 2002. Any redesign of training would be accomplished in the April to May 2002 timeframe. At the time this report was prepared, no results were available.

Literature also discusses several gender-related issues that may impact the Objective Force. Martin Walker's Army Enlisted Attrition Study [83], for example, confirms several of the findings for women leaving the Army. Also, in the paper by Maggie Gallagher [24], several potential issues (that are also applicable to the Objective Force) are discussed.

- **"Technology has not provided the Air Force with automatic litter-loaders to move wounded soldiers onto MEDEVAC aircraft, a task women are unable to do."**
- **"Many of the buttons that need pushing are attached to large pieces of equipment that must be hauled in haste back and forth across the battlefield."**
- **"The military redesigns equipment and redefines tasks to accommodate lesser female strength, assigning more soldiers to do the same task when women are part of the team."**
- **"Women are also expensive to deploy, because they are more likely to get injured, take time off when sick and get pregnant."**
- **"Women leave the military in greater numbers; attrition rates for women are 36 percent higher in recent years."**
- **"Marriage and family reasons top the list of reasons women opt out of the military life, not fears about discrimination."**

Not all of the services see gender-integrated training the same way. The US Marine Corps is the only uniformed military service that maintains gender-separate basic training. Some feel that this has contributed to the lack of Marine Corps recruiting and retention problems that the Army and Navy experiences. Studies also indicate that the Marine Corps maintains a high level of morale.

The entire question of the role of women in the military is being debated in addition to the basic question of gender-integrated basic training. Literature also discusses the psychological differences as well. Some of these differences include differences in values and interests that make males more likely than females to find satisfaction in military careers. Similarly, the literature discusses the differences in certain cognitive processes (e.g., males are heavily over represented among those with high levels of mechanical aptitude and navigation skills). Of course, some argue that this is just a matter of social conditioning whereby women are taught to develop other skills. The point being made here is that the debate on the role of women in combat is ongoing and that evidence for and against increased roles for women continues to be developed.

Males and females see gender-related issues differently. Indeed, the Heritage Foundation Executive Memorandum [68] provides some insight into the effects of the problems related to gender integration, **"...may account in part for the fact that 47 percent of all females, but only 28 percent of men, leave the service before the end of their third year of service."** Clearly, both loss rates are disruptive to the military.

3.4 Race/Ethnicity Considerations. The youth population is not homogenous in its outlook of the future. The also youth have significant differences in their outlook across

racial/ethnic lines. A comparison of several youth characteristics is shown in Table 4. (Sources: Yankelovich Youth Monitor [91], Hispanic Monitor [92], and African-American Monitor [90]).

Table 4. Some Characteristics of Mainstream, African-American, and Hispanic Youth

| Characteristic | Me.2 (Mainstream) | African-American | Hispanic |
|----------------|---|---|--|
| Autonomy | Know and do what's best for me | Perceived need to work harder to get ahead | Fitting in, but staying true to self |
| Diversity | Accept and celebrate different lifestyles | Celebrate diversity and alternate lifestyles | Advocate tolerance to each other and their own |
| Enjoyment | Want more enjoyable personal experiences/fun | Greater need/desire for fun | Trying to capture excitement and sensation of life |
| Self-Reliance | Can count only on own skills and abilities if want to get along in this world | Somewhat higher and increasingly more self-reliant than whites. | More self-reliant than whites and slightly more than African-Americans |

Whites, Hispanics, and African-Americans make up the largest segment of the population of the United States. Some differences in African-American, Hispanics, and whites are listed below.

- **African-Americans** (Yankelovich 1999/2000 African-American Monitor [90]).
 - Compared to whites, African-Americans tend to be younger (average age 40 years), have larger family size (3, with 49 percent under 18 years old), have lower median income (\$25.6K), and have lower education (28 percent have less than a high school degree).
 - African-Americans have a perceived need to work harder to get ahead.
 - Have concerns that affect their outlook: finances (89%), discrimination by whites (86%), local crime (86%), and their children's future (84%).
 - Sense of self-reliance lags behind whites and Hispanics
 - 90% want to pursue leisure activities to celebrate their African-American heritage
 - More so than whites, appearance is important; clothes and appearance are a way to express themselves.
 - A growing feeling that money is the most meaningful way to express success (significantly higher than whites; African-American youth highest percentage).
- **Hispanics** (Yankelovich Hispanic Monitor 2000 [92]).
 - Compared to whites or African-Americans, Hispanics tend to be younger, (average age 37.2), have larger family size (3.3, with 61 percent under 18 years old), have lower median income (\$24.3k), and have lower education (58 percent have less than a high school degree).

- Although a majority (58 percent) originated from Mexico, Hispanics have multi-ethnic, multi-racial, and multi-lingual origins.
- A majority (72 percent) is foreign born.
- 89 percent of all Hispanics learned Spanish as a first language (78 percent for ages 16 to 24).
- As the Hispanic population increases, the importance of speaking Spanish has increased.
- 47 percent of all Hispanics speak Spanish all the time (27 percent of 16 to 24 year old).
- English language usage and preference for Hispanic youth is not a given. More opportunities are being presented for them to use Spanish.
- Understanding of Hispanics is very difficult since they have such a wide set of experiences and expectations.
- Hispanics have a larger sense of self-reliance than whites or African-Americans.
- Hispanics feel the need to be in charge of every aspect of their life.
- Working hard to come out on top of every situation is important to Hispanics.
- Hispanics are looking for ways to get more control over their own life.
- Hispanics feel more self-reliant than whites and slightly more than African-Americans.

3.5 Present and Expected Immigration Changes. In addition to Gender and Race/Ethnicity differences, the future AEPS environment will be significantly affected and challenged by the wave of immigration that is expected to continue into the future. The Center for Immigration Studies [13] reports that during the 1990's, an average of more than one million immigrants moved into the United States each year. This includes legal as well as illegal immigrants. The census bureau indicates that over the next 50 years, this will increase the US population from its present 270 million to more than 400 million. The foreign-born population of the United States is presently about 10 percent of the population (27 million). Of this total, the Immigration and Naturalization service estimates that about 6 million are illegal aliens.

The present flow of immigration is considerably higher than the average flow of immigrants, doubling in the past generation. The immigrant population is growing at a rate of six and a half times faster than the native-born population. Even during the peak of the Great Wave of immigration in the early 20th century, the number of immigrants living in the United States was about half of what it is today. Additionally, immigration has become the determinate factor in US population growth. The 8.6 million immigrants who indicated that they had arrived between 1990 and 1998 represent 42 percent of the 20.4 million increases in the total US population since 1990.

Since 1970, America has suffered notable increases in traffic congestion, school overcrowding, loss of natural habitat, destruction of prime farmland, and increasing urban sprawl. According to the Center for Immigration Studies, the reason for much of this was that since 1970, more than 68 million people have been added to the US population [15].

This surge took place despite the fact that population growth for Americans has been below the replacement level fertility since 1972. A majority of the growth has taken place because of the immigrants and their children.

According to projections by the Census Bureau, the present Hispanic population constitutes (about) 12.3 percent of the population (Source: Hispanic Monitor 2000 [92]). Within 20 years, this is expected to rise to 20 percent. Although other minority representation will also grow over the next 20 years, the rate of Hispanic growth is enhanced by the proximity of the feeder countries (58% of Hispanics are of Mexican origin) and the recent changes in immigration laws that facilitate the process of becoming citizens. Hispanics immigrate from South America, Dominican Republic, Cuba, Puerto Rico, Central America, and Mexico (in order from smallest percentage to largest). A small percent of the Hispanics originate from nations other than those listed above.

As discussed in the literature, the Hispanic population is younger, on average, than the white or African-American population. Additionally, even though the overall population is expected to grow, there will be more growth in Hispanics in particular and minorities in general than there will be growth in whites. When the minority population is combined with the females, within 20 years white males will be a minority group. As will be discussed below, this, and other factors, will have significant implications on the AEPS.

3.6 Some Implications of the Youth Market on the Objective Force. One of the most significant implications for the Objective Force is the generational changes that are taking place in the youth market and the expected changes that are yet to materialize. The characteristics of the Me.2 generation that increasingly run contrary to service in the military are being reinforced in a society that increasingly shows less interest in the military. LTC Lee A. Harris' report [39] identifies several contributing factors in the recent decline in enlistment. (See also the 18 May 2000 press release of the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies Forum on Why Fewer American Youth Enlist in the Army [46]). These factors include:

- Limits being placed on recruiting in High School;
- A widespread view among potential Army recruits and their parents that the Army is an employer of last resort; and
- Perceptions that base closures and downsizing initiatives signal a lesser need for recruits.

Clearly, the views toward the Army of potential Army recruits and their parents presents the Army with a recruiting dilemma: quantity or quality. Whereas the Army has in the past resolved the issue somewhat by increasing the intake of lower quality recruits, the same solution in the Objective Force is likely to cause extreme difficulty for the Army. This is especially true if, as the Objective Force soldier capabilities suggest, higher quality soldiers will be needed to fill fewer positions. On the other hand, typical methods to increase the high quality are becoming much more expensive. It is doubtful that the Objective Force Army will be able to afford the level of resources needed to effectively compete with industry and colleges for the quality high school graduate.

Despite the ongoing changes in the youth, the feeder system for the AEPS, the military continues to use a system that essentially was developed for an entirely different generation. The values, driving forces, opportunities, technical capability, education, and expectations of the youth when the AEPS was developed are significantly different from those of the youth today. Despite the few changes (e.g., all-voluntary Army, advertising, enlistment incentives), the basic philosophy of the Army treats all recruits the same regardless of skill or capability. Indeed, the lack of lateral entry capability means that those individuals that do have technical skills still have to go through the system as if they had no such capability.

Increasingly, the youth of today and tomorrow view fun as an important aspect of life. The perception of a lack of fun in the military will clearly be an issue with the Objective Force training and deployment requirements. Equally clear is the growing problem of the lack of physical fitness for military enlistment. Not only are the youth increasingly lacking the physical fitness that the military requires (and will probably increase for the Objective Force), they do are not as conscious of their lack of physical fitness as past generations.

81 percent of the 9-17 year-olds feel that being in control of your own life is important. In previous years, the military was perceived as being a place to go for secure employment. Now few youth fear not getting/keeping a job and perceive the military drawdown as a negative factor in their consideration of enlistment.

73 percent of the youth use a home computer for games. However, most Government agencies ban games on its computers. 70 percent of the youth feel that learning is more fun when computers are used. However, the availability of computers for soldiers to use is very limited.

Immigration has been the fuel that fed the population growth over the past decade. This growth has contributed to the congestion in cities, the need to build more schools, and the influx of a growing population that does not speak English. As more and more Hispanic immigrants arrive, they are being encouraged to continue to speak in their native tongue. This could cause difficulty in the Objective Force if language becomes a barrier to enlistment. While the services presently have programs that offer remedial training to enlistees lacking the communications skills required for the military, a relatively small percentage of the soldiers participate in the programs. With the need for more Objective Force training, time available for military duties will become more restricted. Certainly, taking even more time for higher competency in communications will take away time required for other training and military duties.

Presently, over 12 percent of the overall population of the United States is Hispanic. Of the 17- to 24-year-old population of prime interest to the Army, Hispanics comprise about 14 percent. However, about 8 percent of the Army is Hispanic. As the percentage of Hispanics increases, without a significant effort, this imbalance will become even more acute. The Army recognizes the imbalance and is instituting measures to correct it.

According to Hispanic Vista (“Enlisting Spanish to Recruit the Troops” [45]), **“the Army is spending \$150 million during the fiscal year ending Sept 30 to get its message across to potential recruits. The budget includes \$11.3 million for Spanish language advertising and \$3.5 million for ads that target Africa-Americans.”** Clearly, as the minority population in the US increases, the Army will have to increase its overall advertising budget to target minorities. This will make recruiting in the future even more expensive than what it already is.

The issue of gender-integrated training in specific and the role of women in the Army in general will receive even more consideration as the Army transitions to the Objective Force. If, as several authors suggest, the military has redesigned procedures and equipment to accommodate the lower physical capability of women, this will adversely affect the requirement of the Objective Force for a smaller footprint. Additionally, despite the availability for some technology to ameliorate the physical condition of soldiers (both male and female), the need for physical fitness of Objective Force soldiers will require extensive accommodations.

Even with increased technology, support functions on the battlefield require physical capability. Women have participated in non-combat support roles. The Objective Force concept reduces the support footprint and places some of the support functions on the fighting forces. With fewer support soldiers overall, it would seem counterproductive to then design equipment and procedures for the smaller support units that require more individuals to use the equipment. The FrontPage Magazine article by Patricia Hausman [43] offers some recommendations on how the military could effectively deal with the gender issue:

- Reinstate single-sex basic training;
- Abolish sex-based recruiting quotas; and
- Establish job-specific standards independent of sex.

3.7 Summary. This chapter has looked at some of the considerations of the future (Objective Force) youth. These considerations include:

- Changing expectations, desires, characteristics, and attitudes of youth;
- Present and future gender issues;
- Present and future race/ethnicity issues;
- The present and future issues associated with increased immigration; and
- Some Objective Force implications of the changes in the youth market.

Several Objective Force issues that emerge from this review of literature on the future youth market are listed below.

- Overall Physical fitness requirements of the Objective Force versus decline in youth physical fitness.
- Reduced footprint versus need to accommodate limited capability to perform physical tasks (this is not just a gender issue).
- Declining propensity to serve in the military.
- Inability of Army to differentiate between incoming individuals with technical skills.

- Lack of lateral entry opportunities for individuals with technical skills.
- Differences in generational perspective on issues and solutions (includes leadership).
- Increased competition for youth:
 - Among uniformed services;
 - With colleges; and
 - With industry.
- Growing perception that military is not “fun” and lacks job security.
- The military may be forced to accept lower quality as “fairness” or to prove diversity.
- Different value systems for generations (“Me” is not consistent with duty, honor, country).
- More Diversity: female roles, minorities and language/education.

One conclusion based on the review of literature on the present and future youth market seems to be inescapable: change in the market will continue to negatively impact the Army’s ability to acquire and retain the number of quality soldiers required of the present and Objective Force system. A corollary conclusion follows, then, that since the present policies are ineffective in dealing with the present conditions, as the environment continues to be less hospitable toward military service, the policies will become even more ineffective in dealing with Objective Force AEPS issues.

Because the present policies tend to look for resource (e.g., more recruiters, advertising, incentives) or quality/quantity tradeoffs, they effectively perpetuate the conditions of the present ineffective and inefficient AEPS. Perhaps the Army should look for new approaches as it designs the Objective Force of the future. Some possible solutions are discussed in the next chapter of this report.

Chapter 4 – Army Enlistment Production System Issues

4.1 Introduction. Given the current world conditions and the history of the AEPS, it is insightful to look at how an extension of current practices intersects with the future Objective Force soldier capabilities. The motivation for thus looking at the AEPS is to look at the effects that the Objective Force will have in a future environment that is essentially a projection of the past. In this way, we can explore some

The Army is being transformed to facilitate worldwide deployment. To meet operational requirements, the Army is being designed to be a lighter, more strategically mobile force that is capable of having a brigade deployed to a contingency area within 96 hours that will be fully capable of conducting its operations immediately. The force is also being designed so that a division can be deployed anywhere in the world within 120 days and five divisions in 30 days. Clearly, the intent of transforming the Army to have such capability must be driven by the expected need to be able to do so. Equally clear is that the intent of the Objective Force O&O is to facilitate the transformation of the Army into a force that will accomplish the deployment goals.

Deployment of soldiers has become an increasingly frequent course of action for the national strategy. Indeed, as stated in a Soldiers Online article (“Transforming the Best Army in the World” [20]). **“The Army is increasingly called upon to conduct worldwide deterrence, direct action, or maintain stability and support operations. Over the past seven years, the Army has been involved in more missions than in the previous 40 years. Those actions number almost 30 and include a range of missions from Kosovo, Bosnia and Hurricane Andrew, to fighting fires and assisting in flood-damaged areas.”** Given the present world situation and the increasing involvement of the Army in fighting terrorism, the future will be even more demanding for the deployment of soldiers.

The ability of the Objective Force to operate over large mission sets also implies more capability for deployment. Having a force that is predominately of similar capability will allow the Army to select units from a larger set of available units rather than having to go back to the few available units as presently is the situation. A significant change in the size of the units (e.g., smaller footprint) has to be achieved to enable the units to deploy within the established goals. However, smaller footprint means fewer items of equipment and fewer soldiers will be needed to accomplish the mission. This could exacerbate the deployment problem especially if the bill payer for enablers and high technology is reduced personnel.

The capability that the Objective Force will provide to the operational forces also will significantly affect the AEPS. For example, the previous chapters have shown that increased operational tempos have had a negative effect on recruiting and retention. As the Objective Force uses its new capabilities, there will be even more pressure placed on the AEPS. The next sections of this chapter will explore some of the issues that the Objective Force may face as it is transformed into the future. Following the discussion of

some of the Objective Force AEPS issues, Chapter 5 includes a discussion of several possible courses of action to address these issues.

4.2 Personnel Issues. Personnel issues today need resolution because they have potential future consequences with the Objective Force.

- Evaluating the success of the Army in terms of end strength leads to inefficient operations. Given that the Army has to take in a certain number of recruits and retain a certain number of individuals to maintain end strength, it has several options available. If the Army retains individuals that it would otherwise discharge, the recruiting mission is decreased. However, those individuals that are retained may not meet the Army standards. End strength of the Army is measured on 30 September of each year. Several implications are listed below.
 - This encourages surges at the end of the year to help the Army to make its end strength requirements.
 - This encourages the Army to “pillage DEP” to increase shipping rates at the end of the fiscal year.
 - This encourages the Army to bring in lower quality soldiers. This puts a large burden on the training base (it has limited resources for remedial training).
- End strength policy may also contribute to increased attrition. Because end strength is computed on a single day (30 September), several processes can be radically changed at that time to help to improve the end strength calculation. This change of process then creates several undesirable results in the AEPS. Attrition increases when more individuals are brought into the Army that cannot meet its standards. It should also be pointed out that even though end strength may be thus achieved, the Army gets little or no return on investment from the individuals that fail to complete their term of enlistment. In addition to not getting a return on the investment, the Army has to divert even more resources (e.g., financial, recruiters, trainers, management, etc.) to deal with the problem. In actuality, the Army fails to achieve an effective end strength and would almost certainly be better off by allowing end strength to drop and saving the investing the freed-up resources for other purposes (e.g., for the Objective Force enablers).
- The lack of an effective lateral entry capability affects how the Army treats individuals with advanced technical training. The present system is oriented to basic entry. If the Army becomes successful in attracting vocational school, community college, and college graduates, how can these individuals be integrated into the Army without having to go through the entire basic process? Consider the 63B10 Light Vehicle Mechanic Vocational/Technical (VOTEC) Pilot Study – Phase II experiment that was conducted several years ago [61]. This experiment recruited individuals into MOS 63-B10 (Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic) with a mechanical aptitude (as measured by a special test). The individuals attended basic training and a short (4-weeks) Advanced Individual Training (versus the normal 13-week course). Principle conclusions of the study asserts, **“Soldiers demonstrating prior mechanical knowledge by passing a MOS qualification test (MQT) and trained using a 4-week Advanced Individual Training (AIT) are at least as competent and may be more competent soldiers and mechanics than soldier**

mechanics trained in the current 13-week AIT. The US Army could realize cost savings by implementing a 4-week AIT program for 63B10 mechanics.” The point is that this was a mechanism that allowed the individuals with advanced capabilities to get through the training system faster and at lower cost. However, to do so requires a change in how the Army treats individuals with advanced technology training/capability. Without an effective lateral entry capability, the Army:

- Starts those with some technical training at the same basic level as those with no technical training;
 - Takes time to constantly rebuild technical expertise; and
 - Lacks the ability to provide entry-level soldiers with technical expertise a meaningful and appropriate experience (treats everyone as an interchangeable part of the system).
- Up or out hurts retention of high technology capability because the emphasis is on leadership skills. This forces the Army to discharge individuals that may have good technical skills. This, in turn, not only increases the recruiting mission, it adds to the training base cost and forces the system to replace experienced technicians with less experienced soldiers fresh from the training base.
- Zero defects hurts retention because of fear to make mistakes. Under this paradigm, receiving a bad mark on a performance evaluation can cause more harm than good marks can help. This system rewards cautious conservatism over innovative thinking that involves risk.
- The present focus is on short-term performance rather than putting into place policies and procedures that will serve in the long-term perspective. Since each leader is judged on present results, they are reluctant to take on long-term projects. Concentration on what can be done “on my watch” assures that the individual gets recognition now on career-building accomplishments. Unfortunately, this makes it very difficult to evaluate and institute required changes.
- Forced rotations or new jobs every two or three years interrupts the process of building of unit cohesion and causes the unit to constantly “go back to square one” as new individual replacements arrive. The disruption also affects the family of the soldier.
- Forced retirement results in the loss of expertise that is sorely needed by the Army and replacement of the lost expertise with relatively less experienced individuals. Katherine McIntire Peters [65] addressed the personnel problem on 15 January 2002: **“Since Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld took office last winter, he frequently has complained that the current system of forcing people to retire in the prime of their intellect and transferring them to new jobs or units every two or three years creates unnecessary turbulence in the personal lives of service members, and makes managing programs and operations more difficult than it needs to be.”** (Defense Beat columnists address defense and national security issues every Tuesday at GovExec.com).
- Micromanagement results when leaders become more concerned with not making a mistake than in getting things done. This means that decision-making gets pushed higher and higher. One example of micromanagement was contained in

the Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) findings (Soldiers Online [41]) **“Many junior officers said that, rather than have senior leaders provide very prescriptive training scenarios and policies that tell them exactly what to do on a daily basis, they would prefer being given the resources to create their own plans to solve problems and learn by doing so.”**

- High frequency of deployment puts pressure not only on the soldier but the soldier’s family as well. The 1995 news release (“New CSA: Talking About the Future” [42]) indicates that, **“In light of the Army’s recent commitments around the world, ‘you can make a case that we are going too fast.’ We’ve done some studies that show that the average soldier spends about 138 days away from home each year.”** According to Soldiers Online, “Surveying Soldiers Concerns” [41]), Operational Tempo has increased by more than 300 percent in the last decade. This increase in OPTEMPO has been accompanied by a significant downsizing, thereby adding deployment burden to a shrinking military. Although the SAILOR 21: A Research Vision to Attract, Retain, and Utilize the 21st Century Sailor [67] document addresses the Navy, it is equally applicable to the Army: **“Expanding missions are increasing operating tempos and time away from home. Retention of highly skilled Sailors and officers will continue to suffer. Thirty percent crew turnover per year cripples the ability of the Fleet to train and deploy as cohesive units.”**
- Reduced footprint of the Objective Force may put pressure on family life. Depending on how future reductions take place, the continued drawdown could further erode the propensity of the youth market that would respond by feeling that the Army does not have job security.
- These problems contribute to the atmosphere that treats individuals as interchangeable parts in an Army machine that apparently has little consideration for the individual, the individual’s family, or the quality of time spent in a developmental assignment. According to the Soldiers Online article “Surveying Soldiers Concerns” [41], **“OPM tends to focus on a road map to success, rather than on quality within an operational assignment, especially a branch-qualifying assignment like platoon leader, company commander, operations officer, and so on.”** Clearly, rapid deployments and other characteristics of the Objective Force can significantly add to the problem of rotating individuals through a system without providing an opportunity for the individuals to achieve required training and experiences.

4.3 Training Issues. Whereas the Objective Force training concept addressed the issue of training, it did not look at how the present AEPS may interact with the training concepts. Some of the Personnel/Training issues for the Objective Force are listed below.

- Just in Time (JIT) training may adversely affect career progression and career “road map.” Presently, according to the Soldiers Online article (“Surveying Soldiers Concerns” [41]), Army education policy today selects 50 percent of its majors to attend an intermediate-level resident course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The other 50 percent have to get it by some other means. This creates a concern for those at the mid-career point who have not been selected for the

resident course. This indicates that there is a strong perception that formal school training is a required “ticket punch” to remain competitive. Will JIT satisfy the needs of the Army while sacrificing the individual careers because the individuals do not receive “appropriate” and “recognized” training in a formal school setting?

- Distributed training (especially self-paced) may be viewed negatively relative to “school training.” For example, there has been an impression that resident CGSC was more of a career enabler than taking the course by correspondence. Also, how will soldier have time for self-paced training given the demand for other training time? Studies have show that soldiers/sailors do not complete in-service college courses because of busy training schedule. Will supervisors/leaders give the soldier time for even “Army” training let alone other “civilian” training? Given the O&O statement [77], **“increased training for Objective Force that exceeds the present already busy training schedule”** it is not clear how there will be time for all of the other time demands that will be placed on the soldier (including some time for family).
- Training time frequently receives low priority. Back-to-back deployments, for example, affects mission-essential-task-list training (see Soldiers Online, “Surveying Soldiers Concerns” [41]).
- Training distractions hamper the ability of leaders to concentrate on training within their organizations. In the Soldiers Online article [41], **“Many of our training policies create a culture that forces our senior leaders to think about training their higher headquarters. It takes battalion and brigade commanders away from their units and hampers their ability to concentrate on training within their organizations.”**
- The literature reviewed has not addressed the issue of how the Objective Force Reserve Component individuals will get as much training as Active Component given the limited time available for RC duty.

4.4 Recruiting Issues. Several recruiting problems of the AEPS have been discussed in the previous chapters. These problems create several issues that are listed below.

- Unexpected personnel losses (e.g., attrition) will continue to negatively affect the Army’s ability to maintain quality its full spectrum capability. According to a General Accounting Office paper [28] (Military Personnel: First-Term Recruiting and Attrition Continue to Require Focused Attention), **“The services’ problems with recruiting first-term enlistees are exacerbated by the fact that they have historically lost about one-third of their enlistees before they have completed their initial terms of service.”** With a presumed smaller force, these losses will not only put increased pressure on the recruiters to make up for the losses; the losses will adversely affect the Army’s readiness. Perhaps equally important is the added costs. According to the Military Update article by Tom Philpott (“New Incentives Attract Recruits But Record Number Leaves Early” [66]), 39 percent of Army recruits do not complete their first term enlistment. The cost of recruiting and training each enlistee is \$38,000. With an Active Duty mission of only 75,000, this means that the yearly cost to the Army for this attrition alone is over one billion dollars.

- The Army will have greater competition with industry for the quality market. According to Tom Philpott's article, the maximum enlistment bonus that the Army can offer for hard-to-fill specialties has recently been raised from \$12,000 to \$20,000 and the Army College Fund maximum was raised to \$50,000. Additionally, for the first time, top prospects can be offered some combination of these major incentive programs. Generally, higher bonus/incentive amounts require longer terms of enlistment. According to the recent GAO report [28], in addition to increased bonus/incentives, the Army has already increased the number of recruiters. From fiscal year 1993 through 1998, the Army increased its number of recruiters from 4,368 to 6,331. It also increased its advertising budget from \$32.8 million in fiscal year 1993 to \$97.2 million in 1998. With the increased amount of bonuses, the bonus budget increased from \$58.2 million in fiscal year 1998 to \$103.7 million in fiscal year 1999. Clearly, competition for the quality soldiers is already an expensive proposition. Equally clear, the competition for the quality recruit will become more intensive in the future. This means that it will become increasingly expensive for the Army to continue to use its present AEPS.
- Increased physical and mental agility requirement for the Objective Force will be more difficult to meet given the growing lack of youth physical fitness. Presently, the military has a number of "remedial" programs to expand its recruiting market to persons that would normally not be sought out in the past. According to the GAO paper [28], the Army targets youth who do not have a high school diploma but who have higher-than-average aptitude scores and no disciplinary problems (The General Educational Development Plus Program). For physical fitness, the Army has found that increasing the standards usually results in more discharges in basic training due to medical problems or failure to meet standards. According to the Soldiers Online article by Dr. Ed Thomas [71], **"Army recruits fresh from the civilian sector generally have poor posture and motor patterns that impede training and lead to injuries."**
- The role of women in the Objective Force will continue to be examined and perhaps increased. Given the emphasis of physical agility for the Objective Force, this issue could exacerbate an already difficult and very contentious problem for the Army. According to "Attrition Rate Contradicts Coed Training's 'Success'" [17], 43 percent of white women fail to complete their first enlistment because of physical problems, pregnancy, failure to adapt to the military, or other reasons. Women account for 18 percent of the enlistees. White women account for 55 percent of the women in the military. Studies have shown that increased physical standards result in increased separations due to physical injury or inability to meet physical standards.
- The Army should examine the need to keep active duty soldier recruiters when the Army needs "bill payers" for the Objective Force enablers. As a return on investment consideration, even if the recruiters are totally successful in their recruiting mission, recruiting training costs the Army money to constantly turnover the recruiting force with soldiers that entered the Army for some other purpose. Additionally, after these soldier-recruiters are returned to their original MOS, the experience in recruiting is not related to and brings little capability to the soldier. Indeed, the soldier probably requires additional MOS training to become familiar

with the state-of-the-art technology that was introduced while the soldier was on recruiting duty.

- Soldier-recruiters will have difficulty in keeping current in recruiting affairs while simultaneously remaining competitive with their Objective Force contemporaries that do not have recruiting duties. The time spent in recruiting functions not only takes the recruiter out of the Objective Force Army, it could be disruptive of the soldier's career as well. Despite the term "All-Voluntary Army," the recruiters are not all volunteers. Perhaps soldiers view recruiting as a career diversion that takes them out of their primary MOS and returns them in a less competitive form. With the need for even more training, the Objective Force could cause even more career damage to soldiers on recruiting duty. Clearly, these soldier-recruiters cannot maintain a high level of training in both recruiting and their primary MOS while putting in an excessive number of hours in recruiting.

4.5 Retention Issues.

- More deployments and fewer soldiers to deploy will undoubtedly affect family life. Whereas the increase in the number of units having Objective Force capabilities will lessen the need to constantly deploy a few specialized units, there undoubtedly will be more deployment missions. The Army needs to look at ways that will lessen the effects of deployment.
- The increased emphasis on technical skills must be reconciled against leadership skills. There may be soldiers that just want to be the best technicians. However, if they lack the leadership training and experiences, they are subject to forced separation. The Army should look for ways that retain individuals with technical skills without forcing them to take unwanted leadership training.
- The use of civilian education recruiting incentives affects retention. As has been shown in the literature, most individuals that take advantage of these education incentives leave the Army. Whereas there may be provisions for the soldier to use the benefits for family members, this does not adequately address the individual's needs. Additionally, in-service education has been a problem for soldiers that already have a busy training schedule. Certainly the Objective Force training requirements will be even more severe, making it quite difficult for a soldier to get in-service college credits.
- Assignments in Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) units, the non-operational part of the Army, may make Objective Force soldiers and officers less competitive relative to those that serve in operational force units. When coupled with the "up or out" policy, will a TDA assignment mark an individual for termination because of the lack of critical training and experiences that the individuals in the operating forces are obtaining? The Soldiers Online article, "Surveying Soldiers Concerns" [41] points out that soldiers often serve in TDA units for which their training courses did not prepare them.

4.6 AEPS Enabling Actions for the Objective Force. Katherine McIntire Peters discussion in the Defense Beat [65] discusses some of the expected benefits of fixing the personnel system. Quoting the research of Dr. Jonathan Shay, a psychiatrist who works with Vietnam veterans in the Department of Veterans Affairs Outpatient Clinic at Tufts

University, she reports: **“When personnel turn over too fast, especially leaders, all the cognitive and emotional resources that should go into learning go into figuring out the new people. Three things – cohesion, leadership and training – are critical to preventing psychological injury in combat, he says. What’s more, those three factors increase military effectiveness.”** Given the intensity of training and other soldier capabilities required of the Objective Force, it would seem imperative for the Army to resolve this issue of the ineffective and counterproductive personnel system. The return on this AEPS investment will be a strengthening of unit cohesion and leadership, two of the essential capabilities of the Objective Force.

Current Army strategy is the same as when the All-Voluntary Army concept was initiated: direct competition for high quality youth. This strategy was in place when the Army had a competitive edge (primarily the GI Bill, a relatively high youth unemployment, and the use of bonuses and other incentives). As the competition for high quality youth increased, alternatives available to youth also increased. The Army responded by more direct head-on competition, increasing the level of resources (recruiters, advertising, bonuses, etc.), and providing enlistment incentives (bonuses, educational programs, higher pay, etc.).

The present system continues to look at increased resources as the primary way to offset increased competition and decreased interest in the youth population for Army service. The past and present concept of how support services are delivered to the battlefield resulted in the need to train the technicians as soldiers. This also means that a primary focus on the technical individuals is on leadership skills. However, the Objective Force is introducing initiatives that could help to lessen the impact on the system.

Split-based operations, for example, not only reduces the deployment requirements, it also makes possible the use of non-uniformed individuals to carry out essential Army technical jobs. The Army used to have a system that allowed individuals to focus on technical skills. In World War II, these individuals were designated Technical Sergeants. In more modern times, the designation was to Specialists. Unfortunately, the Army personnel paradigm equated Specialists with leadership and NCOs. The personnel system would not recognize that Specialist 7's, for example, could be under the leadership of Sergeant E-5's. Thus, it equated pay grade to rank, thereby effectively obscuring the technical status of an individual.

Youth expectations, capabilities, and limitations will also have a significant impact on the Army of the future. The growing affluence of today means that youth expectations for high salary and other status symbols will put even more pressure for increased salaries, bonuses, and other incentives to attract the youth as well as higher salaries, bonuses, and other incentives to retain the soldier. The high demand for youth employment means that competition with business and industry will be keen. However, given the past inability of the military to keep salaries aligned with the market place, this will present a growing barrier to recruitment and retention.

Some of the youth expectations will be consistent with the development of the Objective Force. For example, the youth are growing up with technology and increasingly expects to have and use it. The Objective Force's extensive use of technology enablers will be very compatible with the expectations of the youth. However, the youth see that job performance (e.g., merit) is more important than time in grade or any other variable as a deciding factor in determining advancement. For an organization that has built a promotion system heavily on time in grade, entry at the lower levels with limited lateral entry, and other longevity considerations, this could be a significant factor for the military. Another one of the traditions of the military that could cause difficulty with a generation that sees sexual orientation as an inclusiveness issue is the issue of homosexuality.

The conflict in values in the youth will also present some challenges to the Objective Force Army. Recall from the discussion following the listing of the O&O Objective Force soldier capabilities in Table 2 that one of the important characteristics of the soldier of the future is Conscientiousness and Integrity. This means that future training will have to consistently deal with ethical training as well as technical training.

The January/February 2000 issue of GenTrends [84] shows that industry faces some of the same problems that the Army faces: **"80% of executives worldwide say that by 2010, attracting and retaining people will be the number one force in strategy."** However, the task of reducing employee turnover, according to GenTrends can be dealt with if the organization is able to make changes to accommodate the growing trend: **"In the 1980's, Ohio State University psychologist John Wanous discovered that organizations can reduce their rate of employee turnover by lowering the expectations of new individuals."** It appears that an essential consideration for the Objective Force will be how recruits are integrated into the operational forces. With the inevitable downsizing that will accompany the evolution of the Objective Force, coupled with the significant and growing schedule of deployments, expectations for new recruit performance could be significant. This may actually be exacerbated by the higher technical expertise that the youth possess at the point of enlistment.

In addition to adaptations to reduce the expectations of new individuals, a number of other changes for the Army to consider are indicated by Robert Wendover [86].

- Deliver clear messages about corporate values, up front.
- Do not use phrases like "paying your dues" and "long hours will get you ahead" (or, as frequently is stated in the military, "do more with less").
- Providing for the quality of life is important.
- Assure that there is a stimulating work environment.
- Provide opportunities for friendship and training opportunities.
- Focus on the task instead of outcomes.
- Provide clear guidance.
- Some individuals will progress faster than others.
- Sell the individuals on the big picture; they like forward thinking.
- Provide examples of success and opportunity to advance.

- Show the individuals that they can succeed. The path to success should not be littered with anachronistic obstacles.

4.7 Summary of AEPS Issues. The present AEPS has a number of issues that negatively affects its performance. Some of these problems have origins that go back to the days when the present system was developed. These problems are not isolated within a specific part of the process. On the contrary, they go across the entire system so that one problem in one part of the system ripples to other parts of the system. Army policy on retention, for example, affects the number of soldiers that have to be recruited, which affects the training base. Training base and other AEPS losses, in turn, affects the recruiting mission.

Additionally, the environment also affects the AEPS. Youth capabilities, limitations, expectations, experiences, economic conditions, employment possibilities, and many other conditions shape the recruiting market. These conditions continue to affect the individuals transitioning through recruiting, training, and assignment processes. These conditions are also rapidly changing as new generations of youth gain additional experiences and form new expectations. These changes result in a recruiting environment that is radically different from the original AEPS environment.

While the Army has attempted to adjust the system that was developed for a different set of conditions than what are being experienced by today's youth, the basic philosophy and operating principles remain the same. Increasingly, this is causing difficulty in the AEPS in a number of areas that include unplanned losses, turnover, and turbulence. One of the historical means of dealing with these issues has been the infusion of more resources (human as well as financial). As the problems continue to manifest themselves, the infusion of more resources resulted in a system that has increasingly become inefficient and ineffective.

The Objective Force will result in a much more capable Army with greater lethality, faster deployment capability, and higher technology systems. The transformation includes changes in operational concepts and doctrine, organizational structure changes, and a significant number of technology enablers. However, the thrust of the transformation analysis has not effectively looked at the AEPS and its transformation. As a result, there are a number of issues that are not being evaluated. Indeed, the cursory look in this report at the AEPS from an Objective Force perspective indicates that several of the Objective Force capabilities will exacerbate the already troubled AEPS.

If the Army continues to use historical methods to address the AEPS Objective Force issues, the Army will continue the process of modifications rather than looking at structural changes that should be made. Given the present difficulties with the AEPS, the changing environment, and the characteristics of the Objective Force, a number of issues have been identified in this report. The issues are categorized into several subject areas with considerations affecting the issue. Table 5 summarizes the issues and considerations. The last column indicates the pages in this report where the specific topic that relates to the issue is discussed.

Table 5. Summary of AEPS Issue

| Subject | Issue/Considerations affecting issue | Pages discussed |
|-----------------|---|--|
| Current Process | <p>The current AEPS process is outdated, inefficient, and is not oriented toward a civilian market.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Outdated, inefficient - Antiquated management system - Lacks long term effectiveness - Treats individuals as interchangeable parts - Many aspects are turn-offs to youth | <p>24, 25, 49, 51</p> <p>18, 22, 25, 29</p> <p>24, 44, 52, 53</p> <p>23, 45</p> <p>25, 29</p> |
| Personnel | <p>The personnel system has a number of characteristics that hurts the AEPS now and will cause even more difficulty with achieving the Objective Force desired capabilities.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Lacks lateral entry capability - End strength - Turnover - First-term attrition - DEP losses - Up or out - Zero defects - Forced rotations - Micromanagement - Family life - Interchangeable parts | <p>23, 40, 42, 50</p> <p>16, 19, 24, 44, 51</p> <p>16, 22, 48, 50</p> <p>14, 21, 36, 44,</p> <p>18</p> <p>16, 44, 49, 52</p> <p>16, 23, 44</p> <p>45</p> <p>23, 45</p> <p>26, 36, 45, 48</p> <p>46</p> |
| Training | <p>Increased Objective Force training requirements will put increased pressure on soldiers and their families, on the personnel and recruiting systems, and on turnover.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Just in time and career management - Distributed versus school training - Training versus deployments - Training distractions - Reserve Component training | <p>46</p> <p>46</p> <p>46, 48</p> <p>46</p> <p>46</p> |
| Retention | <p>A key to success of the Objective Force will be to increase retention of technical skills to reduce funding, personnel, training, and other requirements.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High OPTEMPO increases losses - System-wide losses - Retention of technical skills - Competition by civilian employers - Past goal of downsizing - Educational benefits - Turnover increases AEPS demands | <p>15, 27, 43, 45</p> <p>14, 15, 22, 35</p> <p>16, 52</p> <p>26, 30, 46, 47</p> <p>16, 24, 26, 45</p> <p>16, 23, 26</p> <p>23, 45</p> |

Continued on the next page.

Table 5. Summary of AEPS Issue (Continued)

| Subject | Issue/Considerations affecting issue | Pages discussed |
|-------------------------|---|---|
| Recruiting | <p>Army recruiting diverts soldiers from the tasks for which they enlisted and increasingly is bringing in marginal soldiers that do not meet Army needs to fill unexpected vacancies.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Enlisted recruiters taken from force - Recruiter soldiers lack experience - Negative influencers/influences - Quality versus quantity of recruits - Competition with industry - Increased physical and mental capability - Role of women in Objective Force - Recruiter competitiveness - Recruiting advanced technology | <p>24, 48</p> <p>24</p> <p>26</p> <p>28, 39</p> <p>24, 39, 50</p> <p>4, 6, 10</p> <p>34, 47</p> <p>48, 49</p> <p>48</p> |
| Losses | Unexpected losses, which are being experienced system-wide, result in little or no return on investment and are not getting sufficient management attention. | 23, 44, 48, 53 |
| Focus | The focus of management is short-term; there is little long-term focus on the Objective Force effects on the future AEPS. | 44 |
| Operational Environment | Changes occur in the AEPS operational environment faster than the institutional training can accommodate. | 9 |
| Policy | <p>Policies are ineffective in dealing with the civilian market and some policies (e.g., weight, retention, performance) run counter to retaining technically qualified soldiers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Outdated, ineffective with civilian market - Drawdown focus created friction in AEPS - Some policies counter to retention - Old traditions clash with new expectations | <p>26, 27, 45, 47</p> <p>19, 27, 45</p> <p>23, 49, 52</p> <p>27, 29, 50, 54</p> |
| Funding | <p>The EPS lacks sufficient funds and funding authority to carry out needed/essential programs while at the same time achieving the Objective Force capabilities and obtaining the technological enablers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Resources do not keep up - Funding levels unlikely to be sustained - End strength as modernization bill payer - Incentives being reduced | <p>19, 29, 44, 51</p> <p>23, 24</p> <p>24, 43</p> <p>26, 27</p> |

Continued on the next page.

Table 5. Summary of AEPS Issue (Continued)

| Subject | Issue/Considerations affecting issue | Pages discussed |
|-----------------------|---|------------------------|
| Changing Demographics | The recruiting market is rapidly changing, but there is not an effective program to evaluate how the changing attitudes of the market could affect the Objective Force. | |
| | - Generational effects change youth market | 18, 20, 39, 54 |
| | - Generational effects in officers | 20, 45 |
| | - Youth physical fitness is declining | 21, 32, 41 |
| | - Military service not considered essential | 22, 30, 34 |
| | - Youth characteristics and military values | 33, 36, 50 |
| | - Population declines without immigration | 38 |
| | - Immigration changing minority make-up | 38 |
| | - Gender differences affect performance | 30, 34 |
| | - Race/ethnicity characteristics differ | 37 |
| | - Hispanics fastest growing minority | 40 |
| | - Declining propensity for military service | 19, 41, 45 |

This chapter has consolidated the issues that have been discussed through the report and presented some indications of the environment that will exist for the Objective Force. The assessment in this chapter compares the present AEPS and expected future conditions of the Objective Force capabilities discussed in Chapter 1 of this report. From this comparative analysis, issues surface that should be addressed by the AEPS community in concert with the Objective Force design. Chapter 5 of this report will discuss some of the conclusions and recommendations that arose from the comparative analysis of this chapter.

Chapter 5 – Conclusions and Recommendations

5.1 Conclusion: Traditional Analysis Coverage of Issues. There is a large amount of literature that deals with predicting the effectiveness of certain alternatives. Some of that literature has been referenced in this report. While the analytic models discussed in the literature shed light on the AEPS problems, it is important to recognize that many of them look at isolated aspects of the AEPS problem. These models employ a “traditional” approach to evaluating a particular problem. For example, the models may look at ways to increase fill. The approach is illustrated below by two goals: increase recruit fill and decrease attrition.

| <u>Goal</u> | <u>Traditional Approach</u> | <u>Consequences or trade-offs</u> |
|--------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Increase Fill | Lower physical/mental standards | Increases attrition |
| | Take more non-high school grads | Increases attrition |
| | Increase recruiting resources | Cost per recruit increases |
| Decrease Attrition | | Market routinely expects increases |
| | | Education incentives lower retention |
| | Shorten DEP time | Attrition increases |
| | Remedial programs | Costs increase |
| | Lengthen DEP time | Retention not certain |
| | | Increases DEP losses |

Some predictive models contain numerous variables that are used to predict performance of certain goals. However, these models typically ask a decision maker to trade one undesirable outcome for a somewhat less desirable outcome. In the examples above, the goal of increased fill can be affected by a number of variables (e.g., lower physical/mental standards, more non-high school graduates, and increase recruiting resources). However, these variables, in turn, have some undesirable consequences or trade-offs.

In addition to the undesirable consequences, these models generally have a number of explicit assumptions. They also have a number of unstated assumptions because they keep a number of conditions constant. Some of the unstated assumptions in the models include the following:

- The personnel system (no change in how the personnel system works);
- The processes (processes will remain the same or have some perturbation of present processes);
- The environment (the recruiting environment remains essentially the same over long periods of time, thus enabling time series analyses);
- Army tradition (the Army will maintain the way it processes and treats recruits, the way that individuals enter the Army, entry from the bottom, etc.); and
- Generational effects (the youth of today are essentially motivated the same way that they were in the past).

What the previous sections of this report have shown is that these unstated assumptions historically limit the set of alternative solutions that are considered in analysis. By failing

to look at the personnel system for changes, for example, the number of possible alternatives precludes the ability to look at retention policy, lateral entry capability, end strength problems, and other areas listed in Table 5. Similarly, by keeping the current processes constant, outdated and inefficient processes, long-term effectiveness, and other issues addressed in Table 5 are automatically eliminated from consideration. Army tradition is also an unstated assumption in most analyses. One frequently used reason for these three unstated assumptions is that it will be too difficult to change the Army's systems, processes, and traditions. Note, however, that this leaves few other viable alternatives except to increase resources, decrease requirements, or manipulate the system (e.g., retain soldiers, shorten DEP time, and increase waivers at the end of a Fiscal Year to achieve authorized end strength). As discussed above, however, these alternatives negatively affect the various portions of the AEPS at some other point in time.

The unstated assumptions on the environment and the generational effects have been shown in a number of references to be wrong. This means that models that use time series data will incompletely predict outcomes. This also means that the models will invariably "go wrong" as time progresses because the environmental and generational changes are happening too fast for the model to compensate. Thus, there is a need to constantly update the model. Certainly, this limits the use of the models for long-term decision-making processes.

The focus of current research has a variety of approaches as shown below:

- Model behavior as socio-economic and demographic relationships;
- Cost-effective trade-offs (e.g., DEP loss and number of recruiters);
- Trend over constant generational time changes; and
- Keep everything else constant.

One of the problems with some of these approaches is that they do not consider the decision making approach used by the potential recruit. Some also work on the assumption that what is good for the Government is all that matters. Increasing the amount of money offered for educational benefits, for example, may be a cost effective incentive for the Government, but many of those that participate in the program do not use it and the Government knows that they will not.

The purpose of the discussion above is not to find fault with current modeling and analysis techniques. In many respects, the reason for the unstated assumptions is the lack of willingness of the Army to address changes that would be needed to implement changes in operating procedures that appropriately address the unstated assumptions. As was discussed in previous sections of this report, part of the reason for this approach is the near-term approach to problem solving. Addressing the unstated assumptions in a meaningful manner will take time to implement.

It is important to look at the analysis process in light of the Objective Force concepts and requirements. Whereas some models may trade-off one undesirable aspect for a less undesirable aspect, both aspects may be very undesirable for the Objective Force. Some

of the soldier requirements, Objective Force implications, and consequences or trade-offs are listed below.

| <u>Soldier Requirement</u> | <u>Objective Force Implication</u> | <u>Consequence or trade-off</u> |
|-----------------------------------|---|--|
| Deploy faster | Hither performance standards | Increase attrition |
| Multifunctional | Enhanced soldier capabilities | Cost per recruit increases |
| High tech capable | Competes with enablers cost | Market expects increases |
| Multiple mission sets | Competition for funds increases | Decreased retention |
| Frequent deployments | Increased experience levels | Increase DEP losses |
| Deploy faster | More training time needed | |
| Self-sufficient | Smaller footprint and force | |
| Longer deployments | | |

The information above is intended to be read in columns rather than in rows. For example, the soldier requirement to be able to deploy faster could have one or more Objective Function implications (higher performance demands, enhanced soldier capabilities, etc.). Some of the consequences of the soldier requirements could be increased attrition, cost per recruit increases, etc. What the above list does show is that the consequences or trade-offs are inconsistent with the Objective Force Implications and soldier requirements. Clearly, any trade-off listed above is not desirable from an Objective Force perspective. Thus, the solution set for acceptable, feasible alternatives has to be increased. The only way to do this is to allow more environmental, policy, and/or other variables to be considered in the analysis.

To summarize the discussion on the “traditional” approach to analysis, the personnel system, processes, and Army tradition “constants” have not been significantly changed since the inception of the All-Voluntary Army. In addition to the recruiting environment and the generational differences in the market, these have also been treated as “constants” by research. Additionally, the current models evaluate proposed programs in terms of decision-making criteria that may not be used by the changing target youth population

5.2 Overall Conclusions. From the investigative analysis reported in this study, several overall conclusions result.

- Based on the literature review and other analyses performed, the AEPS does not appear to be totally coordinated across its component parts. Without planned changes, some of the present recruiting, retention, personnel, and training problems in the present will be exacerbated by the Objective Force concepts. Additionally, some of the Objective Force concepts from one AEPS area may cause additional stress other parts of the AEPS.
- “Tweaking” the system will provide, at best, marginal changes to the efficiency and effectiveness of the AEPS. This is based on the assessments in the literature that suggests that the current process requires significant changes to meet the future challenges.
- No single “silver bullet” will solve the efficiency and effectiveness problem of the AEPS. The changes will have to cross AEPS boundaries. Recruiting, retention,

personnel, and training policies have impacts on each other, but policies frequently are made in isolation of the effects on other parts of the system. The changes will also require a long-term perspective. This alone will be a formidable obstacle, given the near-term focus of the present decision making process.

- Unless the current strategy is changed, the AEPS results most likely will not significantly improve. This means that more and more resources will be required by the present system to keep it at its present capability. With the inception of the all-voluntary Army, the Army had a competitive edge that worked in the days when there were few alternatives for unemployed youth. As alternatives for the youth market increased, the Army increasingly attempted to compete with industry in attracting the same quality individuals that they were seeking. This competition forces the Army into increasing its resources across the board: more recruiters, more bonus money, more advertising, more educational benefits, etc. Unless overall Army funding is increased, this increased level of resourcing will come at the expense of other programs. Clearly, the Army will need a bill payer for the Objective Force enablers. Accordingly, it is doubtful that the Army will be able to sustain the level of resources required of the present AEPS. As a result, without substantive changes, the AEPS will continue to suffer from the ineffective, inefficient, and inconsistent results of a process that requires structural changes.
- The personnel system, processes, and Army tradition “constants” have not been significantly changed since the inception of the all-voluntary Army. In addition to the recruiting environment and the generational differences in the market, several variables have also been treated as “constants” by research. As a result, the current models evaluate proposed programs in terms of decision-making criteria that may not be used by the target youth population. The Army should explore changes in the “constants” to be able to look at a more extensive set of alternatives for the Objective Force. However, this may require some structural changes that will take some time to put in place.
- As long as the Army is not in control of the entire AEPS, it cannot really take control of the Army EPS.

5.3 AEPS Process Conclusions. In addition to the overall conclusions listed above, several additional process conclusions result from the analysis of the issues contained in the references consulted. These process conclusions are listed below.

- The AEPS uses essentially the same processes and policies that were in effect when the Services drafted large numbers of citizens. The Army still treats the recruit the same way as when the drafted individuals were undereducated and did not want to be in the Army. The MEPS experience is unnecessarily long and complicated. It is also unnecessary in this day of information management systems.
- The Army increasingly is going after the higher mental category individuals that are also increasingly going to college and are sought by industry and other competitors. However, the Army clings to the use of the ASVAB as the only official tool for classification. The high quality individuals that the Army seeks use the SAT, ACT, or other academic tests for admission into college. High schools increasingly are having less time available in student schedules to allow ASVAB testing in school because of mandated standards of learning testing and testing for college admission.

Even though the military recently made some accommodation to the use of SAT, the ASVAB remains the official tool for classification.

- Although the basic structure of MOS has meaning to the Army, it is alien to the civilian population. It is a system that was devised in the days of the draft and has been made more complex over the years to accommodate a growing technology required by the Army. The Army should contract with recruits for position categories such as electronics, mechanic, and other terms that are used in the civilian population.
- Based on the analysis of the literature referenced in this report and the Objective Force soldier requirements, only programs that have a solid return on investment should be funded. To achieve a reduction in funding for the Objective Force AEPS, enlistment standards (physical, mental, and moral) should be raised and adhered to even this results in lower end strength. This course of action explicitly recognizes that the high level of attrition results in low return on investment (e.g., loss of effective manpower), increases future demands on an already burdened AEPS, and contributes little to the Army's mission even though the official end strength may be achieved. The loss of manpower, however, is expensive in that increased recruiting, training, and operating costs divert money from other Army programs. The reality of the current situation is that even though end strength may be met, the number of useful man-years available to the Army is decreasing. Research has shown that lowering enlistment standards to allow enlistments having lower mental category, non high school graduates, less physically fit, and moral waivers increases attrition. The Army has been experimenting with increasing the percentage of each of these categories. It might be argued that the standards should remain high and allow the end strength to decline. This would save recruiting, training, and other resources. Even though the end strength would decline, the number of man-years completed by enlistees would remain nearly the same.
- The technical requirements for the Objective Force will increase. However, present personnel policies concentrate on leadership versus technical qualifications. The Army should concentrate on retention of qualified technical personnel and place less emphasis for these individuals on leadership training. The up or out policy should be eliminated and replaced with a system that evaluates individuals on the basis of their technical skills. These individuals should be placed in non-leadership status (e.g., specialists or technical grades) to differentiate them from NCO positions.
- Training approaches remain essentially the same as when the draft was in place. There is no way for a student to "test out" of some particular training should the student have prior training in that area. Self-paced instruction is available, but as a result of an inflexible personnel system, students are still processed as a class. Thus, when a student finishes early, the student remains until the normal class graduation date.
- Training should also be streamlined to account for training/ability that the individual brings. This is especially critical if the Army continues to pursue the college and technical school market. The Army did a study of the 63B10 (Wheeled Vehicle Mechanic) MOS. A group of students that passed a mechanical aptitude test was given a 4-week advanced individual training course instead of the normal

13-week course. The analysis showed that those students with the mechanical aptitude performed in every aspect as well as the students going through the 13-week course. The point is that training is made to be inefficient to enable the Army to push everyone through at the same pace (which was the way it was during the draft when personnel and information systems were unable to cope with the individual).

- Current enlistment contracts have so much specificity that the Army has lost flexibility in handling individuals that want to change their training. Students in college, for example, frequently change majors, so colleges have developed programs that have core courses that all students take and specific courses once a major is declared. This enables incoming students to get more information on their abilities and the requirements of a major prior to declaring the major. The Army could develop its curricula into “core and strand” courses. Core courses would be the ones that everyone that enters a certain field is required to take. Electronics, for example, core courses would include basic electricity. Strand courses would be the specialty area. If, for example, a person enlisted for electronics, core courses could be completed in a community college as part of College First or the student could test out of the requirement based on some training or aptitude. The students in the electronics area could then compete for the strand courses (the competition could also consider other items such as Physical Training results, performance/academic reviews, etc.). The point is, the Army could allow civilian acquired training to have a real effect in the progress of the individual through training instead of forcing everyone through the same training that is aimed at the individual with no prior training or experience. It would also allow the Army greater flexibility in determining the students that are qualified for the more technical courses. This would also facilitate the use of civilian standardized tests as an enlistment screen since actual performance on core courses would be available for classification. However, the personnel system would require changes to be able to accommodate the changing training capability.
- Increasingly, the Army is competing for individuals with highly complex technical skills. However, the Army is less competitive with the civilian market. The result is that the Army has a very high turnover in its technical skills, resulting in the need for a very expensive training program. To reduce turnover in technical areas, the Army could look at the need for having so many of the highly technical skills being filled by uniformed individuals. As things presently stand, the Army provides very good entry-level skill training, produces a highly experienced technician, and then the person leaves the Army. This cycle of acquisition and training is very inefficient and results in the highly experienced individuals leaving the Army as the civilian job markets expand. If the technical skills were civilian, the expertise could be retained and the resources dedicated to maintaining an inefficient process could be freed for other use. The Objective Force concept of split-based operations will facilitate the use of civilians as opposed to having uniformed support personnel.
- There is also a real generational change that has been taking place at an accelerated rate. This means that the students that are making their way up through the civilian schools have expectations and behaviors that are very much different from the Army.

5.4 Recommendations. The literature reviewed for this report contains a number of recommendations for improving the AEPS. However, these recommendations were made without explicit consideration for the goals, objectives, design characteristics, and other considerations of the Objective Force. Although the author of this report feels that many of the recommendations documented in the literature reviewed have merit, only two recommendations for follow-on action are made herein.

CONDUCT AEPS WARGAMES. The AEPS community should conduct several wargames with the concept developers for the Objective Force to identify additional issues, analyze the impact of potential solutions to the issues, map out courses of action to resolve issues, and explicitly link the AEPS to the ongoing Army Transformation processes. The author of this report has participated in a number of Army Transformation Wargames that explored critical issues and provided analytic underpinning for proposed concepts (including Army After Next, the Interim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT), ATWG 2001, and ATWG 2002). In addition to clarification of issues, these exercises allowed proponents to influence the design of the units, the concepts, and organizational structures. Combat Service Support, for example, was tailored to meet the demands of the combat forces. However, deployment, sustainment, and other issues affected the design of combat units. The analysis was enabled through common scenarios, common assumptions, and other common areas of interest. This enabled the combat and support designers to communicate their concerns as well as to listen to concerns from other communities. The same type of exercises is needed for the AEPS community. The AEPS changes should be driven by the design and requirements of the Objective Force, but the designers of the Objective Force should also be made aware of considerations such as youth competition, recruiting processes, training processes, etc.

EVALUATE CURRENT PROCESSES: **The Army really needs an outsider to look at all of its current processes in view of the Objective Force design concepts and make recommendations to align them with the modern times.** Changes to the system up to now have mostly been adaptations to the processes established when we were fighting the Second World War. This means that some of the traditions that were formed during the draft era have to give way to the present situation. A large body of literature indicates that the present AEPS is a very inefficient and ineffective system that forces the Army to pump more and more resources into it to keep pace with manpower requirements. While the Army will be looking for a bill payer for the technological enablers and other changes required by the Objective Force concept, the lack of appropriate return on investment in the AEPS will cause the Army to cut essential manpower, training, or other programs. These cuts may be unnecessary if the AEPS is made to be more efficient and effective.

Without a thorough process review and appropriate changes in processes that align the AEPS with the Objective Force requirements, the Army will not see a long-term success and will continue to see a decline in its return on investment in the AEPS. The Objective Force soldier capabilities and transformation provides a unique opportunity for

simultaneously changing the way on how the Army will fight at the same time that it aligns its AEPS for the specific youth market, resources available, and other conditions in the future.

5.5 Courses of Action to Implement AEPS Changes. The discussions in the previous sections cover a very broad set of AEPS circumstances that would involve some significant changes for the Army to implement. Obviously, prior to initiating changes, the Army would have to have a thorough assessment of the changes to determine policies, procedures, and perhaps laws that might have to be changed as well. Some of these changes are within the purview of the AEPS organizations to change and others will take significant effort by the Army to accomplish. Several changes can be grouped into a Course of Action (COA) that will take minimal changes. Other changes will require some organizational changes, while others will require significant organizational changes as well as require moderate resources to implement. Still other recommendations will take a significant change in organizations as well as changes in the fundamental way that the Army accesses manpower.

These changes may also require significant resources to implement. However, it is expected that once these changes are made that resources should be reduced when the new AEPS is more efficient and effective. Additionally, given the inertia of change, it is important for the Army to begin to make changes now in anticipation of the Objective Force. Some of the inertia is caused by outdated laws, some is caused by the Army's trying to adapt a system that was developed for a different time, set of conditions, and generation rather than making genuine changes that address problems that are becoming more acute. The Army could sequence the changes into COAs that start with minor changes ("tweaking" the system) and progress through changes that will take a significant effort to accomplish. Obviously, the decision to implement a specific COA will require further analysis to determine the cost of implementing and the return on investment after implementing. Although the study team has identified some resource implications of the present inefficient system, an evaluation of resource implications of the COAs is outside the scope of this effort.

The Army has many alternative courses of action available to it. Some of the choices of actions that can be taken are listed below.

- **Minor Changes.** Continue to "tweak" the current system without major changes in current processes, policies, and business practices. This historical course of action requires the least amount of effort by the Army and could produce some marginal short-term improvements in recruitment and retention. This also results in trade-offs to choose the least of several undesirable outcomes. This continues the analysis approach that uses the unstated assumptions. However, it does not address the growing recruiting and retention problems in the long-term.
- **Increase Competition.** Develop new programs to compete with the other Military Services, educational institutions, and job market. There is evidence in the literature that the Military Services already are competing with each other for recruits. The competitive service effects are most noticeable between the Navy and the Army. The Army has already tried to compete with the educational

institutions by offering more money for college and increasing its programs for in-service college. However, even with present conditions, it is difficult for soldiers to complete in-service college courses. Also, given the increased future training requirements for the Objective Force, it is doubtful that the soldier would have the time or that there would be a suitable environment to study. Additionally, there probably would be a lack of command willingness to allow soldiers to be away from their Army jobs to take college courses. In-service completion of college is already very low, so it probably will not increase, especially if even more demands are placed on the soldier (training, deployment, etc.). The Army also tries to compete with industry by offering increasing bonuses. The military also will not be able to compete against industry in pay and benefits unless something very serious affects the economy. In some respects, this course of action is exactly what the Military Services have been trying to do since the mid-1980s when they enjoyed a competitive edge that they no longer enjoy.

- **Policy, Practice, and Process Changes.** Make some fundamental changes in policy, business practices, and processes. This course of action would look at the very nature of many current Army practices. For example, the selection and classification system could be changed to allow individuals to enter the service on the basis of standardized tests used to admit students into college (e.g., the SAT or ACT) in lieu of the ASVAB. Other changes would allow for variable term enlistments (which are presently in effect despite the official policy in view of the fact that a significant percent of enlistees do not complete their enlistment contract). This course of action would require the Army to experiment with options such as lateral entry (allowing skilled individuals to enter the Army at levels appreciably above the normal entry grades), use more civilian employees and/or contractors to outsource technical jobs that are essentially civilian jobs, change the position and classification system so that there are fewer MOSs that are expressed in terms familiar to the civilian market (e.g., electrician, plumber, mechanic), and other changes that would more closely align the Army technical positions with the civilian world. The enlistment contract itself could be changed so that it does not require the individual to make up-front choices without an experiential-based capability to make a decision. Colleges, for example, have experienced students frequently changing declared majors because they found that they could not or did not want to meet some core course requirements, they had time to find out what they really wanted to do, and many other reasons. Colleges allow individuals to enter and take certain core courses that are required for broad areas of study. This enables students to make the changes without having to go back to take new core courses for the new area of study. By having core courses up front, the Army could also then facilitate the entry of individuals with civilian college credits. These changes would obviously take some initial effort and additional resources to develop, test, and implement the programs. However, because of the cost of current attrition, it could be expected that these changes could have a positive return on investment in the future.
- **Organizational Change.** When the Army collocated its support activities on the battlefield, it was important that every individual was capable of conducting military operations (thus, everyone was a soldier first). However, with the

Objective Force concepts, support will be provided from remote locations. This capability is needed to reduce footprint, deployment time, and enable the ability to rapidly conduct operations with little time for build-up activities. With these capabilities, the need for every support individual to be a soldier should be reexamined. This reexamination should also consider the conversion of military to civilian (contractor or employee) support. With the ability to conduct split-based operations, reach operations, and operations in safe areas, the Objective Force can use more contractor provided and/or civilian employee services. George Cahlink reports in "Army of Contractors" [9] that Brown and Root, a Texas company, provides support services for the Army in Bosnia (\$2.2 billion since troops were first sent to Bosnia in 1995). Additionally, the Quadrennial Defense Review requires that **"Only those functions that must be done at DoD should be kept at DoD."** The paper states, **"With contractors nearly as common as land mines in the Balkins, it's only fitting that when soldiers first step off airplanes in Kosovo, they are met not by their commander, but by a Brown and Root civilian worker who tells them where they can pick up their gear and assigns them to their barracks."** To achieve the footprint reduction goals of the Objective Force, but yet to maintain the degree of support services required, it is essential that the Objective Force planners explicitly include the use of non-uniformed (civilian and contractor) support services. The use of more contractors and/or civilian employees will reduce the need for military and leadership training and allow the Army to retain high technology skills. One way to facilitate the use of civilian employees, assure that civilian employees have military experience, and serve as a recruiting and retention incentive would be to guarantee that a soldier that completes an enlistment tour is guaranteed a job as a civilian employee, with the grade level dependent upon the number of years of military service. This would provide the Army with the support individuals that are required to operate in the field and help to retain the skill of soldiers after they complete their enlistment. Other military/civilian employee recruiting and retention options could be employed to increase the retention of technical skills for the Army.

- **Operational Change.** The AEPS should be changed to enable the leadership and management to better focus on long-term issues. This includes the use of civilians in more critical management roles. Additionally, the personnel system should be changed to allow for retention of technically skilled individuals (e.g., eliminate up-or-out, zero defects, forced retirements, unnecessary forced rotations, and other practices that treat individuals as interchangeable parts).
- **Resource Change.** The Army should evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of existing and proposed future programs and eliminate those that do not have a good return on investment.
- **Experiment.** The Army should experiment with new programs, expanding programs that work and terminating ones that fail to deliver expected results. These programs should include changes to variables that presently are considered to be "constants." Rather than taking actions that increase end strength, a major factor for evaluation should be return on investment. The philosophy for the Objective Force should be to attract, train, and retain only quality soldiers even if that means that end strength declines.

The courses of action should not be viewed as alternatives in the sense that selecting one will preclude the selection of another. Rather, some of the courses of action could be done sequentially. For the short-term, the course of action might be to start out with minimal changes and develop a long-term approach that will phase the changes in policy, business practices, processes, and resources over time. Given the concentration on developing the Objective Force, it is very unlikely that the Army will be able to or desire to initiate broad sweeping changes rapidly.

To enable the long-term courses of action will require an investment strategy to be developed to move from the “tweaking” course of action (e.g., do what can most reasonably be done in the short-term) to the course of action that requires more extensive changes in business practices, policies, processes and resources. In all likelihood, such changes will take place as the Objective Force comes to fruition. The issue is whether the changes will be adaptations to the present inefficient and ineffective processes or planned changes. Thus, the two recommendations (Conduct Wargames and Outside Evaluation) are part of the long-term planning process.

APPENDIX A

List of References

Organization Abbreviations

| | |
|-----------------|---|
| ARI | US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences |
| DMDC | Defense Manpower Data Center |
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| HumRRO | Human Resources Research Organization |
| NPS | US Navy Postgraduate School |
| OASD | Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense |
| RAND | RAND Corporation |
| TRAC-LEE | Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center – Fort Lee |
| USAREC | US Army Recruiting Command |
| USMEPCOM | US Military Entrance Processing Command |

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APPENDIX B

List of Acronyms

Some US Army Recruiting, Retention, Training, and Personnel Implications of the Objective Force:
The Army Enlistment Production System

| Acronym | Meaning |
|----------------|---|
| AAN | Army After Next |
| AC | Active Component |
| ACF | Army College Fund |
| AEPS | Army Enlisted Production System |
| AIT | Advanced Individual Training |
| AOE | Army of Excellence |
| APFT | Army Physical Fitness Test |
| ARI | US Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences |
| ASA | Assistant Secretary of the Army |
| ASCC | Army Service Component Commander |
| ASVAB | Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery |
| ATLDP | Army Training and Leader Development Panel |
| ATWG | Army Transformation Wargame |
| BRAC | Base Realignment and Closure |
| C4I | Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence |
| C4ISR | Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Reconnaissance |
| CDC | Centers for Disease Control |
| CHRM | Center for Human Resources |
| COA | Course of Action |
| CS | Combat Support |
| CSA | Chief of Staff Army |
| CSS | Combat Service Support |
| DA | Department of the Army |
| DCSPER | Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel |
| DEP | Delayed Entry Program |
| DMDC | Defense Manpower Data Center |
| DoD | Department of Defense |
| DON | Department of the Navy |
| DOTMLP | Doctrine, Organizations, Training and Education, Materiel, Leadership, and Personnel |
| EOD | Explosive Ordnance Disposal |
| FY | Fiscal Year |
| GAO | General Accounting Office |
| HQ | Headquarters |
| HR | Human Resources |

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| | |
|----------|---|
| HumRRO | Human Resources Research Organization |
| IBCT | Interim Brigade Combat Team |
| IET | Initial Entry Training |
| JFLC | Joint Forces Land Component Commander |
| JIT | Just in Time |
| JTF | Joint Task Force |
| M&RA | Manpower and Reserve Affairs |
| MEPS | Military Entrance Processing Station |
| MGIB | Montgomery GI Bill |
| MOS | Military Occupational Specialty |
| MQT | Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Qualification Test |
| MRE | Meal Ready to Eat |
| MS | Maneuver Support |
| MTW | Major Theater War |
| NCA | National Command Authority |
| NCO | Non Commissioned Officer |
| NPS | US Navy Postgraduate School |
| O&O | Operational and Organizational |
| OASD | Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense |
| OF | Objective Force |
| OPTEMPO | Operating Tempo |
| OSD | Office of the Secretary of Defense |
| PRT | Physical Readiness Training |
| PSAT | Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test |
| PSS | Personnel Service Support |
| PT | Physical Training |
| R&D | Research and Development |
| RAND | RAND Corporation |
| RC | Reserve Component |
| RCP | Retention Control Point |
| SAT | Scholastic Aptitude Test |
| TDA | Table of Distribution and Allowances |
| TRAC | US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center |
| TRAC-LEE | Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Analysis Center – Fort Lee |
| TRADOC | US Army Training and Doctrine Command |
| US | United States |

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| | |
|----------|---|
| USAREC | US Army Recruiting Command |
| USMEPCOM | US Military Entrance Processing Command |
| VA | Veteran's Administration |
| VOTEC | Vocational/Technical |
| Xers | Generation X |